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TO CLOAK THE WITHIN: PROTECTING EMPLOYEES
FROM PERSONALITY TESTING
Elizabeth D. De Armond*
"A man is what he thinks about all day long."'
INTRODUCTION
"An x-ray of personality."2 An MRI scan of the soul. Medical
technology has advanced to the point that we can literally see inside
the body's machinery; devices can tell us where, precisely, a bone is
broken, an artery is blocked, a tumor has bloomed. We may often
want a similar view into the workings of the contents of people's
minds, not just their bodies. We want to see the metaphorical breaks,
blockages, and tumors lurking within the brain's gray matter. Perhaps
the advances in technology that provide windows into a person's phys-
ical side lull us into thinking that we have similar tools for looking into
the psychological side.
Employers increasingly want to examine the personalities of appli-
cants and employees, but the testing of individuals can inflict distinct
privacy harms that are not always justified by employers' needs. Soci-
ological scholarship supports our need to protect our personalities
from widespread view. However, existing laws insufficiently protect
our personalities and should be adapted to protect the picking of indi-
viduals' minds.
News accounts note that employers increasingly test and investigate
applicants to sift through them.3 Employers have long been interested
in one's past, both at work (were you a reliable employee?) and
* Professor, Legal Research and Writing, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I thank Susan Ad-
ams and Ken Hollender for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. THE BOOK OF POSITIVE QUOTATIONS 345 (John Cook et al. eds., Fairview Press 2d ed.
1997) (quoting Ralph Waldo Emerson).
2. Epilogue to ANNIE MURPHY PAUL, THE CULT OF PERSONALITY 221 (2004).
3. See Alan M. Goldstein & Shoshanah D. Epstein, Personality Testing in Employment: Useful
Business Tool or Civil Rights Violation?, 24 LAB. LAw. 243 (2008); see also Sarah Kershaw, My
Other Family Is the Office, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 4, 2008, at El (citing an organizational psychologist
who states that personality tests are given to millions of employees each year); Toby Manthey,
Tests Tag Workers' Good, Bad Traits, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Oct. 26, 2008, at Bi;
Samantha Maziarz Christmann, Employee Screening Turns into Constant Scrutiny, BUFF. NEWS,
Aug. 5, 2009, at Al.
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outside of work (do you have a criminal record?). Increasingly,
though, employers investigate how you think-not just when you are
at work, but also when you are not. Nearly one in five of the Fortune
1,000 firms use personality testing to screen candidates.4
Traditional background or reference checks seek to discover what
an employee or applicant has done. In contrast, personality testing
seeks to discern who an employee is: how that employee thinks and
what that employee feels. With the results of a personality test, an
employer may well believe that it can predict how that employee will
behave and perform,5 and use that information to either screen out or
screen in candidates. 6
Employers may give such tests pass-fail power over a candidate,
such that the score on the test overrides any other information in an
applicant's record. For instance, in 2011 the Chicago Public Schools
(CPS) system used a "soft skills" personality test to screen teachers
and initially excluded anyone who scored below a set floor.7 Thus, a
candidate's results could eliminate him from contention even when
the candidate's other credentials, such as recommendations from
those who had witnessed the candidate's live teaching, were excel-
lent.8 After complaints, the school system decided not use the test as
a sole screener.9
Recently, some employees have begun to resist this sort of testing.
Metrolink, which runs a southern California commuter rail service,
sought to require its conductors and engineers to take a "personality
inventory" designed to reveal an applicant's "work tendencies, habits
and personality traits."10 Union leaders representing the workers ob-
jected, criticizing the test as invalid and irrelevant to the ability of a
trained, experienced employee to safely operate a train and arguing
4. Robert Sprague, Googling Job Applicants: Incorporating Personal Information into Hiring
Decisions, 23 LAB. LAw. 19, 27 (2007).
5. But see Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1403 (2000) (noting that in the context of gathering information about
consumers, "research in economics, psychology, and information theory suggests that the rela-
tionship between data and behavior is much more complicated").
6. See Sprague, supra note 4, at 27.
7. Rosalind Rossi, Critics: CPS Test for Teacher Applicants Leads to "Blacklisting," CHI. SUN-
TIMES (July 22, 2011, 12:49 PM), http://www.suntimes.comlnewsleducation/6620153-418/critics-
cps-test-for-teacher-applicants-leads-to-blackisting.html. The test, called "TeacherFit," had
questions that sought to investigate "personality or attitude" attributes that were intended to
measure the "soft skills" that teachers use, including "student focus, planning and organizing,
results-focus, perseverance and self-initiative." Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Rich Connell, Metrolink Workers Object to Personality Testing, L.A. TIMEs (Apr. 1, 2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/01/local/la-me-metrolink-testsl-2010aprOl.
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that forcing current employees to take the tests could result in arbi-
trary dismissals." The conductors and engineers threatened to boy-
cott the tests.12
Despite the popularity of personality assessments with employers,
however, we have no MRI scan for the soul. Furthermore, from a
privacy perspective, these personality tests may inflict distinct harms.
First, the inquisition of the testing itself may intrude on the individ-
ual's solitude. Second, the information disclosed may reveal, or pur-
port to reveal, too much of the individual's private being. An accurate
test may disclose more of the individual's internal life than the em-
ployer's needs can justify. An inaccurate test may lead an observer to
view the person as someone she is not. Either way, the disclosure of
the test's results can inflict harm.
Technology leads to the risk of additional harm. The information
acquired-accurate or otherwise-may be published, disseminated,
and passed around to others or even entities not in existence at the
time of the test. Technology makes such information highly mobile.
What once would have been kept in a file folder, perhaps in a locked
cabinet, can be stored digitally and transferred electronically, whether
on purpose or accidentally. Test results could be forwarded to an-
other employer or an insurance company, or even posted on the In-
ternet for all to see. Thus, a global database of personality test results
that could be searched, mined, and processed through algorithms is
not farfetched.
Erving Goffman, a twentieth-century sociologist, observed that we
have "territories of the self,"' 3 which are "preserves" with boundaries
over which we can exercise some control.14 To develop as persons, we
develop "situational personalities," revealing some territories to some
individuals, and some territories to others.15 In particular, individuals
11. Id. The plan for psychological screening arose after a Metrolink train ran a red light and
crashed into a freight train. Id. The following investigation revealed that the train's engineer
had violated safety rules, had sent and received hundreds of text messages while working, and
had even "sneaked young rail fans onto locomotives and apparently let at least one sit at the
controls," notwithstanding the fact that the engineer had received favorable evaluations. Id.
12. Id.
13. ERVING GOFFMAN, The Territories of the Self, in RELATIONS IN PUBLIC 28, 40-41 (1971)
[hereinafter GOFFMAN, The Territories of the Self].
14. See Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57
OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 691 (1996) (citing GOFFMAN, The Territories of the Self, supra note 13, at
28-29).
15. See Avner Levin & Patricia Sinchez Abril, Two Notions of Privacy Online, 11 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 1001, 1013 (2009) (describing a "dignity-focused" view of privacy) (citing ER-
VING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959) [hereinafter GOFFMAN,
THE PRESENTATION OF SELF]).
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will seek to conceal stigmatizing aspects of themselves if they can.16
Personality testing can intrude upon those territories of the self that
an individual is entitled to shield from third parties' eyes. Employers
who impose such tests may intrude upon areas of the self that they are
not entitled to see and may observe-or believe they observe-attrib-
utes that are unduly stigmatizing to the employee without a sufficient
business need to do so. If the employers disseminate test results, the
disclosure may pigeonhole, or even stigmatize, the test-takers in the
eyes of far more individuals than the takers ever anticipated.
Furthermore, the tests likely do not sufficiently meet employers'
needs to justify these harms. The lauded tests may not be reliable;
that is, the same test given twice to the same person may yield differ-
ent results. In addition, such assessments may not have great valid-
ity.' 7 First, the tests (or the interpretation of their results) may not
accurately assess the traits sought by the employer. Second, regard-
less of the test's ability to accurately assess a particular trait, the em-
ployer may not have accurately identified the traits needed to succeed
at the job.'8
This Article begins by discussing employers' use of personal infor-
mation of employees and potential employees.19 Part III follows with
a discussion of the possible consequences of employee personality
testing and the potential impact on privacy from a sociological per-
spective. 20 Part IV describes the existing legal structures that may re-
strict employee personality testing, as well as the shortcomings of
these structures.21 Finally, Part V proposes a possible solution to both
fulfill employers' needs to learn about relevant private information
about their employees and to preserve individuals' privacy and their
territories of the self.22
16. See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 3
(1963) [hereinafter GOFFMAN, STIGMA]. A stigmatizing attribute is one that is "deeply discredit-
ing." Id.
17. See Irving B. Weiner & Gregory J. Meyer, Personality Assessment with the Rorschach
Inkblot Method, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 277, 286 (James N.
Butcher ed., 2009).
18. Stephen F. Befort, Pre-Employment Screening and Investigation: Navigating Between a
Rock and a Hard Place, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 365, 368 (1997) ("[T]he predictive value of pre-
employment screening depends upon linking the selection plan with an accurate assessment of
the qualifications relevant to successful job performance.").
19. See infra notes 23-129 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 130-92 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 193-294 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 295-323 and accompanying text.
1132 [Vol. 61:1129
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II. FROM BACKGROUND CHECKS TO PERSONALITY EXAMS
Employers can convincingly argue that they need to investigate
their applicants and even current employees. First, employees, as
human capital, are vital to productivity. Companies lose millions of
dollars each year from poor hiring and promotion choices.23 And in-
dividuals are not always truthful about themselves and their back-
grounds. Background checks of an applicant's claims can reveal a
great deal of dissembling. Some surveys indicate that almost half of
job applicants lie about their work history and education.24 Accord-
ingly, employers cannot simply take r6sumds at face value.
Furthermore, in addition to risk, responsibility follows the hiring of
an employee. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an em-
ployer can be found liable for a number of the employee's acts con-
ducted within the job's scope. 25 Under negligent hiring doctrines, an
employer may even find itself responsible for criminal acts of an em-
ployee conducted outside the job's scope.26 Employee background
checks and testing make sense to many; any employer would like to
avoid the problems that FedEx Corp. faced when it was accused of
hiring a sex offender who later was charged with molesting a boy
23. Lisa Daniel, Use Personality Tests Legally and Effectively, STAFFING MGMT. (Jan. 4,2005),
http://www.shrm.org/Publications/StaffingManagementMagazine/EditorialContent/Pages/0504
cover.aspx (estimating that a company with 200 employees and a $30 million payroll could ex-
pect to lose $1 million a year to bad hires).
24. Robert Sprague, Rethinking Information Privacy in an Age of Online Transparency, 25
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMp. L.J. 395, 397-98 (2008).
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006) (defining the doctrine of respondeat
superior).
26. The Restatement (Second) of Agency provides as follows:
A person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject to liability
for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless:
(b) in the employment of improper persons or instrumentalities in work involving
risk of harm to others:
(c) in the supervision of the activity; or
(d) in permitting, or failing to prevent, negligent or other tortious conduct by per-
sons, whether or not his servants or agents, upon premises or with instrumentalities
under his control.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958); see also Bates v. Doria, 502 N.E.2d 454, 458
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986) ("An employer does have a duty to refrain from hiring or retaining an em-
ployee who is a threat to third persons to whom the employee is exposed, and such a cause of
action arises in favor of a person who is injured as the proximate result of the employer's negli-
gence in hiring or retaining the employee." (citation omitted)); Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508,
516 (N.J. 1982) ("An employer will only be held responsible for the torts of its employees be-
yond the scope of the employment where it knew or had reason to know of the particular unfit-
ness, incompetence or dangerous attributes of the employee and could reasonably have foreseen
that such qualities created a risk of harm to other persons.").
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while on the job.2 7 Employers are also justifiably concerned that an
employee may create a hostile work environment by abusing the com-
pany's Internet access or email systems, which could lead to liability
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.28
A. Background Checks-Assessing Past Behavior
Liability concerns have led employers to use various kinds of back-
ground checks on both applicants and current employees. Some of
these checks examine not only on-the-job behavior, but also off-hours
behavior. Accordingly, employers may test for the use of impairing
substances, search criminal and other public records, order credit re-
ports, and verify claims of salary and position. An employer may even
acquire reports of an employee's or applicant's behavior as a con-
sumer or on a social network.
Employers are justifiably interested in their employees' or appli-
cants' off-hours behavior that could impact on-the-job performance,
especially if that behavior is illegal or can impair workplace safety.
Most typically, employers fear that an employee's use of illegal sub-
stances will impair that employee's job performance, and that fear
may well be justifiable. 29 Accordingly, employers have long tested for
marijuana, other illegal drugs, or alcohol.30
Inquiries into past conduct can advance beyond substance testing,
though. Employers commonly search through criminal records; a re-
cent study reported that nearly ninety percent of companies said that
they conducted criminal background checks on some or all of their
employees.31 Criminal records may comprise any or all of conviction,
parole, or arrest records. With the digitization of such records, even
27. See John Christoffersen, Privacy, Reliability Issues Put Background Checks on Trial, PrrT.
POST GAZETTE, Dec. 30, 2005, at El. FedEx claimed that it did do a background check on the
charged employee but that the check did not reveal his prior crime. Id.
28. Robert Sprague, From Taylorism to the Omnipticon: Expanding Employee Surveillance
Beyond the Workplace, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 4 (2007).
29. For instance, a railway employer has a clear, defensible interest in learning whether those
operating heavy transportation equipment have taken illegal substances, even if the employee
ingested them before coming to work. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602
(1989) (upholding drug and alcohol tests of employees who had been involved in a train accident
as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). In addition, the Supreme Court recently ruled
that any constitutional right to information privacy does not preclude the federal government
from requiring federal contract employees with long-term access to federal facilities from sub-
mitting to a background check that inquires into alcohol and illegal drug use. NASA v. Nelson,
131 S. Ct. 746, 759-60 (2011).
30. See, e.g., KENNETH D. TUNNELL, PISSING ON DEMAND: WORKPLACE DRUG TESTING AND
THE RISE OF THE DETOX INDUSTRY 6-8 (2004).
31. Erica Goode, Internet Lets a Criminal Past Catch Up Quicker, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2011,
at A17.
[Vol. 61:11291134
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old conviction records may now be available for the employer's scru-
tiny and may well skew the employer's evaluation of the candidate.32
Criminal records are only a small subset of public records that a
background check may scan and snatch. Many civil records assembled
by governments are available for employers to peruse as well. For
instance, federal governmental entities maintain nearly 2,000
databases of information culled from individuals for one or another
regulatory purpose, including census data, military and prison records,
and tax returns.33 State governmental entities likewise maintain data
they have acquired, including court documents, public employee sala-
ries, and tax records. 34 Individuals may not know that the information
that they reveal to a governmental agency for one purpose-for in-
stance, to obtain a license or secure a divorce-may then be available
to a future employer for an entirely different purpose. Register for a
license and the registration's information can become incorporated
into a database, information that the governmental entity can then
make available-perhaps for a fee-to interested parties.
Credit reports, another type of background check, may report re-
sults not only from governmental databases but other records as well,
including bank and loan records. According to one measure, sixty
percent of employers use credit reports in making employment deci-
sions.35 A credit report may reveal not only past addresses and em-
32. For instance, in testimony before Congress, a member of the National Employment Law
Project stated that seventy-three percent of private employers conduct some kind of criminal
background check on applicants. Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Barriers to
Reentry for Formerly Incarcerated: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism & Home-
land Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 33 (2010) (testimony of Maurice Emsel-
lem, National Employment Law Project). Some states, however, limit employers' use of criminal
records in their decision making; limits on public employers are more common. See, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-904(E) (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4710 (2007); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 335B.020, .070 (repl. vol. 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2950 (2007); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 296(15) (McKinney 2010 & Supp. 2012); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 750-754 (McKinney 2010 &
Supp. 2012); see also Overview of State Laws that Ban Discrimination by Employers, LEGAL
ACTION CENTER, http://www.lac.org/toolkits/standards/FourteenStateLaws.pdf (last visited on
Aug. 9, 2011).
33. Lee Tien, Privacy, Technology, and Data Mining, 30 OHio N.U. L. REV. 389, 389 (2004);
see also 13 U.S.C. § 8 (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 6107(b); 28 C.F.R. § 512.15 (2010); 32 C.F.R.
§ 70.8(b)(9)(i); A. Michael Froomkin, Government Data Breaches, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1019, 1022-23 (2009) (noting several types of government repositories of personal data that are
at risk for security breaches).
34. See Kelsey M. Swanson, Comment, The Right to Know: An Approach to Gun Licenses and
Public Access to Government Records, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1579, 1583-601 (2009) (describing
various categories of personally identifiable information collected by states and that informa-
tion's availability under freedom of information laws).
35. Background Checking: The Implications of Credit Background Checks on the Decision to
Hire, SHRM.ORG (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/
Pages/BackgroundCheckingImplications.aspx (slide six of sixteen).
2012] 1135
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ployers, but also outstanding debts, charge cards, and bankruptcies.36
A report will also flag delinquencies, a matter of particular concern
given the increasing rates of default on charge cards, auto loans, and
mortgages that arose in the "Great Recession." 37 Responding to that
concern, some states have enacted legislation to limit employers' use
of credit reports when hiring.38
Another type of common background check verifies an applicant's
past position and salary. Employers share information about their
employees' salaries, job titles, and work histories with companies that
specialize in amassing that information so that they can sell it to other
employers seeking to check up on an applicant.39
In addition to information about criminal and public records, credit
transactions, and employment income, background checks can also re-
veal even more personal information about a given individual. Tech-
nology has allowed data miners to amass an amazing amount of
detailed material on individuals' behavior. For instance, Acxiom
Corp., a background screening and marketing company, boasts that it
maintains "a comprehensive database consisting of more than 126 mil-
lion households and 190 million individuals" with a wide variety of
demographic, behavioral, and purchase-related information 40 assem-
36. For a discussion of the disclosures that the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act permits, see
infra notes 243-57 and accompanying text.
37. See Vikas Bajaj & Louise Story, Mortgage Crisis Spreads Beyond Subprime Loans, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at Al (noting an increase in mortgage defaults and charge-off rates by
credit card companies).
38. In 2010, Oregon enacted the Job Applicant Fairness Act, which prohibits most employers
from using credit reports to screen applicants. See S.B. 1045, 75th Leg. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Or.
2010). In testimony before the Act passed, one of the big three consumer reporting agencies,
TransUnion, acknowledged that it did not have evidence that an employee's credit history corre-
lated with subsequent job performance, casting doubts on its validity. Testimony on Oregon's
Job Applicant Fairness Act, VIMEo, http://www.vimeo.com/24479508 (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
Furthermore, many of the credit reports have inaccuracies that can seriously impair the target's
ability to get credit and, one might infer, employment. Mistakes Do Happen: A Look at Errors
in Consumer Reports, OSPIRG, http://www.ospirgstudents.org/reports/consumer/consumer-re-
ports/mistakes-do-happen-a-look-at-errors-in-consumer-credit-reports#iddoxk3nG-111HCs7z6C
f9BQ (last visited Jan. 26, 2012) (concluding that seventy-nine percent of the credit reports sam-
pled had some kind of error and that twenty-five percent had an error serious enough to be
disqualifying). Thus, like personality tests, credit checks may suffer from both kinds of invalid-
ity, neither accurately measuring the traits they purport to measure nor identifying traits that
advance the goals sought.
39. For instance, TALX Corp., owned by Equifax, one of the nation's three biggest consumer
reporting agencies, collects such information for more than 50,000 clients who use the service to
verify an applicant's previous employment and pay. Pamela Yip, It's Not Spying ... Firm Com-
piles Info on Your Job History, Pay for Companies that Need to Check on You, DALL. MORNING
NEWS, Mar. 19, 2008, at 2D.
40. Infobase Consumer List, ACXIOM, http://www.acxiom.com/Site-Assets/Factsheet/FACT-
SHEET-infobase-consumer-list (last visited Jan. 26, 2012). At one time, Acxiom published a
1136
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bled from the digital breadcrumbs we dribble each day with each
transaction. Such firms offer interested employers the ability to gain a
window into the off-hours behavior of an applicant or employee.
B. Personality Assessments-Predicting Future Behavior
These sorts of background checks gather information about an indi-
vidual's past behavior in order to predict future behavior. In contrast,
personality tests try to penetrate the mind's internal processes to pre-
dict future behavior. Mental health professionals have sought to de-
fine the term "personality" and to assess it using a plethora of tests,
but this Article discusses a few of the most common. The use of such
tests by mental health professionals differs distinctly, however, from
the use of such tests by employers.
The earliest modern personality tests arose in the field of psycho-
therapy, which developed these tests to help treat troubled individu-
als, to provide both therapist and patient with information about the
malfunctioning of the patient's mind. 41 Thus, personality assessments
were intended to be part of a comprehensive clinical work-up. How-
ever, when mental health specialists became interested in testing per-
sonalities, employers, especially in the post-World War II era, began
brochure that advertised that one of its databases contained the following types of personal
information:
name; address; phone number; occupation; date of birth; latitudinal/longitudinal coor-
dinates; gender; ethnicity; age; income; net worth; political party; height and weight;
education; marital status; whether subject wears corrective lenses; whether subject rents
or owns dwelling; years of residence; value of home; mortgage amount and interest
rate; home loan to value ratio; date home was built and date purchased; square footage
of home and lot; whether home is located in a census tract where more than 50 percent
of households are non-white; adult age ranges in household; number of adults in house-
hold; children's age ranges in household; number of children in household; number of
generations in household; total number of occupants in household; whether there is a
"working woman" in household; which credit cards subject owns; range of new credit;
where subject likes to shop; model and make of automobile (including a "lifestyle indi-
cator" designation based on the type of car); blue book value of vehicle; whether sub-
ject has a history of buying new cars; whether subject buys items through mail order
and in what dollar amounts; whether subject owns a cat or a dog; whether subject do-
nates to charities; whether subject owns real estate investments; whether subject has
stock/bond investments; whether subject is a military veteran; whether subject likes to
gamble, sew, garden, watch television, hunt, jog, sail, diet, play video games, drink
wine, or read the Bible; and whether subject's overall "lifestyle composite" classifies
him/her as a "Traditionalist," "Connoisseur," "Chiphead" (like computers and science),
or member of the "Intelligentsia."
Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Con-
sumer Data Profiling, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 63, 75-76 (2003).
41. See Introduction to PAUL, supra note 2, at xii.
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to need to sort through large numbers of applicants to find appropri-
ate personnel. 42
What, however, does the term "personality" mean? In contrast to
behavior, which is an actual example of a person's conduct, personal-
ity cannot be observed, measured, or tested directly. Rather,
"[p]ersonality is an abstraction or hypothetical construction from or
about behavior." 43 One observes another's behavior and infers from
those observations a distinct personality. Furthermore, though not
fixed at any point in time, personality has some stability over time and
across different situations and "exerts itself pervasively."44
Personality may be viewed as comprising constituent traits,45 any
one of which may cause a particular behavior. A trait refers to a "dis-
tinguishable, relatively enduring way in which one individual varies
from others." 46 Put another way, traits are "predispositions that exert
fairly generalized effects on behavior." 47 Some psychologists see
traits as the road to insight into the personality; by inferring various
traits from observed behavior and then measuring them, we can chart
dimensions for traits that can be used to compare persons and
groups. 48 A trait, like a personality, has some stability over time and
across different situations.49 Nonetheless, traits alone may not deter-
mine behavior; rather, behavior can arise from "the interaction of trait
and situational variables."50 For instance, someone may generally be
shy, but in a particular situation (such as a party among close friends)
that individual may shed her shyness.
Employers may administer personality tests themselves, through
their human resources department, or through a third-party consult-
42. James N. Butcher, Personality Assessment from the Nineteenth to the Early Twenty-first
Century: Past Achievements and Contemporary Challenges, 6 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1,
5-6 (2010) (describing the use of personality assessments to select individuals for Special Forces
military duty).
43. WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT 4 (1968).
44. Id. at 9.
45. Id. at 6.
46. Id. at 5 (citation omitted). Mischel notes that some personality theorists consider traits as
constructs that psychologists have created, while others define traits as actual states in persons
from which a psychologist infers an underlying attribute. Id.
47. Id. at 6.
48. Id. at 5-6.
49. MISCHEL, supra note 43, at 5-6; Paul T. Costa, Jr. & Robert R. McCrae, The Five-Factor
Model and the NEO Inventories, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT, supra
note 17, at 299, 300-01 (describing traits as not immutable but nonetheless "highly stable over
periods of years and decades, especially after age 30"); Susan C. South et al., Behavior Genetic
Perspectives and Clinical Personality Assessment, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY As-
SESSMENT, supra note 17, at 25, 28 ("[V]ery distinctive personality traits show similar heritabili-
ties, with remarkable regularity.").
50. ANNE ANASTASI & SUSANA URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 380 (7th ed. 1997).
1138 [Vol. 61:1129
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ant. A preferred practice is to use an industrial-organizational psy-
chologist.51 Among the most popular tests used to assess candidates'
personalities are the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
(MMPI), the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, the Rorschach Test, and
the Thematic Apperception Test.52 The MMPI and the Myers-Briggs
Type Indicator are personality inventories that seek to categorize indi-
viduals on a number of scales.53 The MMPI does this by asking a se-
ries of true-false questions,54 while the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
requires test-takers to choose from two possible answers to each of a
series of questions. In contrast, the Rorschach Test and the Thematic
Apperception Test use pictures that an examiner uses to discern cer-
tain personality characteristics.55
Personality tests may be objective or projective.56 In an objective
test, the target may choose from only a limited number of possible
responses. The MMPI, a popular objective test, consists of 566
true-false questions that assess clinical psychopathology. 57 This test
has been given to countless job applicants and serves as the founda-
tion for many more tests that employers use to sort people.58 A psy-
chologist and a neuropsychiatrist at the University of Minnesota
mental hospital developed the MMPI in an attempt to address the
lack of any accepted way to sort the mentally ill into categories.59 The
developers identified hospital patients with clear disorders, and then
assembled a comparison group of presumably healthy individuals
from the hospital's visitors, primarily friends and family members of
patients. 60 The visitors reflected the local population's demographics:
nearly all Protestant, many of Scandinavian ancestry.61 The test de-
velopers administered a collection of true-false questions to both
groups; those answers given by the majority of the control group be-
came the "normal" answers, while those given by a majority of those
who suffered from a particular mental illness became indicators of
51. See Daniel, supra note 23.
52. Introduction to PAUL, supra note 2, at xii-xiii.
53. ANASTASI & URBINA, supra note 50, at 352, 449.
54. Deirdre M. Smith, The Paradox of Personality: Mental Illness, Employment Discrimina-
tion, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 79, 127-28 (2006).
55. See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
56. ANASTASI & URBINA, supra note 50, at 350, 411, 419.
57. Randy Borum & Harley V. Stock, Detection of Deception in Law Enforcement Applicants:
A Preliminary Investigation, 17 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 157, 161 (1993).
58. PAUL, supra note 2, at 63.
59. Id. at 48, 53-54.
60. Id. at 51.
61. Id. at 51-52.
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that illness.62 This process yielded eight separate measures, known as
the Clinical Scales. 63
Another popular objective personality test is the Myers-Briggs Type
Indicator. 64 The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator asks targets 100 ques-
tions, each of which offer two descriptive words and phrases from
which the target must select, leading to the target being assigned to
one of sixteen personality types, identified with DNA-like four letter
strings of markers. 65 Each marker represents one of a pair of oppo-
sites on a particular axis: introverted-extroverted, sensing-intuiting,
thinking-feeling, and judging-perceiving. 66 Like the MMPI, the
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator was not designed for recruiting or selec-
tion.67 Rather, the developer, Isabel Myers, had no formal psycholog-
ical training, but nonetheless sought to create a test that would reveal
aspects of an individual's personality type from their answers to bi-
nary questions, information that she hoped would help the individual
become more self-aware. 68
In contrast to an objective test, in which a target may choose only
from a limited number of responses, a projective technique permits a
virtually "unlimited variety of possible responses." 69 In a projective
test, an examiner provides a relatively unstructured task to a target
and then tries to discern themes that arise from the words the target
uses in response to that task.70 Possibly the most famous of these is
the Rorschach Inkblot test, which comprises ten inkblots; the assessor
evaluates the target's reactions to each inkblot using a rubric called
the "Comprehensive System."71 The results can help a clinician make
a differential diagnosis; however, they do not precisely identify the
particular symptoms of a mental condition.72 Herman Rorschach, a
Swiss physician, developed the famed inkblots while a resident at a
62. Id. at 52.
63. Andrew C. Cox et al., The MMPI-2: History, Interpretation, and Clinical Issues, in Ox-
FORD HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 17, at 250, 251. These scales con-
sisted of the following: Hypochondriasis, Depression, Hysteria, Psychopathic Deviate, Paranoia,
Psychasthenia, Schizophrenia, and Hypomania. Id.
64. PAUL, supra note 2, at 125.
65. See MBTI Basics, MYERS & BRIGGS FOUND., http://www.myersbriggs.org/my-mbti-per-
sonality-type/mbti-basics (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
66. PAUL, supra note 2, at 111.
67. See id. at 110-16.
68. ANASTASI & URBINA, supra note 50, at 449; Introduction to PAUL, supra note 2, at xiii;
PAUL, supra note 2, at 110-11.
69. ANASTASI & URBINA, supra note 50, at 411.
70. Id.; Butcher, supra note 42, at 7.
71. ANASTASI & URBINA, supra note 50, at 411-12; PAUL, supra note 2, at 34.
72. Weiner & Meyer, supra note 17, at 278-79.
1140 [Vol. 61:1129
TO CLOAK THE WITHIN
mental hospital.73 Since refined, the test remains highly popular
among clinicians.74
Where the Rorschach Test uses inkblots, another projective test, the
Thematic Apperception Test, uses pictures; the assessor shows
nineteen different images to the target, then asks the target to de-
scribe a story about each one.7 5 A therapist then evaluates all of the
target's answers, looking for "thema" among them.76 Henry Murray
developed the test while heading up a Harvard University clinic dedi-
cated to studying hypnosis and abnormal psychology.77 As originally
developed, the test's results were not to be used in isolation, but
rather with other tests and the observations of other examiners-a
time-intensive process.78
These tests, both objective and projective, are thought to yield a
picture of the target's personality as a whole. In contrast, subsets of
psychological tests seek to measure discrete traits within a personality.
For instance, one such subset, "honesty" or "integrity" tests, seeks to
identify those individuals who might be more likely to steal, fake sick-
ness, or otherwise dissemble on the job.79 A similar category of tests,
polygraph tests, seeks to determine a candidate's honesty by measur-
ing the candidate's physiological responses to questions.80
Mental health professionals' use of these tests differs sharply from
employers' use. Therapists seek to treat, while employers, as a gen-
eral rule, seek to make employment decisions. Tests designed to re-
veal to a therapist the internal contours of a person's psyche might not
be appropriate to reveal to an employer the best use of which to make
a person.
Furthermore, the two groups may well differ in terms of the empha-
sis they give test results. An employer may not have the skills that a
psychotherapist has to interpret the tests. An employer may not un-
derstand the limits to, and possible flaws of, such a test, but rather
believe that it reveals whether or not the applicant or employee will
serve the employer ably. That belief may lead employers to treat per-
73. PAUL, supra note 2, at 18-19.
74. In one survey, forty percent of clinicians stated that they "frequently" or "always" used
the test, while eighty percent said they did so at least occasionally. PAUL, supra note 2, at 35.
75. ANASTASI & URBINA, supra note 50, at 419; Butcher, supra note 42, at 8.
76. PAUL, supra note 2, at 85.
77. Id. at 78-79.
78. Id. at 85.
79. U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, THE USE OF INTEGRITY TESTS FOR PRE-
EMPLOYMENT SCREENING 1 (1990) [hereinafter INTEGRITY TESTS].
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 2001(4) (2006) (defining "polygraph" for the purposes of the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act); see also infra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
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sonality tests as having pass-or-fail impact. Alex Frankel, the author
of Punching In: The Unauthorized Adventures of a Front-Line Em-
ployee, spent almost two years applying for and working at front-line
jobs for some major companies in the service and retail industries,
such as Enterprise Rent-a-Car and Home Depot.81 Frankel reported
that he applied online at Home Depot and, after failing to advance,
called a local outlet to talk to a real person, who told him that the
computer would not even forward his r6sum6 due to his test results.82
Similarly in 2011, the CPS system initially used a projective test called
TeacherFit as a "high stakes" test, the results of which could com-
pletely eliminate an applicant from contention no matter how strong
the rest of the applicant's record was.83
In contrast, not only will a mental health professional likely under-
stand the strengths and weaknesses of a particular test, but she will
also likely use a personality test's results as one tool among several to
treat a patient. Employers may instead use such tests to single-
handedly screen candidates in a thumbs-up, thumbs-down manner.
In sum, personality tests have arisen to try to determine an individ-
ual's personality, whether as a whole or as a composition of constitu-
ent traits. Both mental health professionals and employers use these
tests, among the most popular of which are the MMPI, the Myers-
Briggs Personality Inventory, the Rorschach Test, and the Thematic
Apperception Test. Employers have sought to use these tests for a
purpose sharply different from their use by mental health profession-
als and often for purposes-and with consequences-never intended
by the tests' original developers.
C. Reliability and Validity Problems with Employer-Given
Personality Tests
Employers have clear reasons for wanting to learn the details of
their employees' personalities, including maximizing productivity and
minimizing risk. However, they probably are not getting what they
seek, an MRI scan of the soul. 84 Not only have these tests received
criticism from mental health professionals, but when they have been
81. ALEX FRANKEL, PUNCHING IN: THE UNAUTHORIZED ADVENTURES OF A FRONT-LINE
EMPLOYEE 58-62, 79-117 (2007).
82. Id. at 58-60.
83. Rosalind Rossi, Teacher Test Under Fire, CmI. SUN-TIMES, July 21, 2011, at 2. After re-
ceiving substantial criticism for placing so much weight on the test, including from the deans of
many teaching colleges, the school system decided not to give make-or-break power to the test's
results. Rosalind Rossi, CPS Flips, Drops Teacher Test, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 22, 2011, at 4.
84. See Epilogue to PAUL, supra note 2, at 221.
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challenged in court by individuals who took them at an employer's
insistence, courts have also expressed uneasiness with their credibility.
The evidence does not indicate that personality assessments pro-
duce reliable, valid assessments of the suitability of a particular tar-
get's personality for a particular employment position that requires
particular skills. First, the tests may not even accurately identify the
traits of a particular target, and different renditions of the test may
produce different results, indicating fragile reliability. Furthermore,
such tests' results only weakly correlate with observable behavior.85
This may be because a target's behavior may be specific to a particular
situation rather than driven by a particular trait.86 Given the unstable
reliability of personality assessments, Dr. Walter Mischel, a psycholo-
gist who has studied them, believes that while they might be suited for
research on individual and group differences, they could not fairly
support the assessment of specific individuals." In short: "the prac-
tice of forensic psychological assessment falls short of its promise."88
In addition to demanding reliability, personality tests must be valid
to achieve employers' aims; that is, the traits the test evaluates should
actually correlate with improved job performance. 89 While one might
naturally think of personality as being an inherent and stable aspect of
a person that will closely impact job performance, particular personal-
ity traits may not necessarily correlate with job performance, and in
fact the context of the particular job situation may influence perform-
ance more than the employee's personality.90
Each of the major personality assessments commonly used for em-
ployment purposes has flaws in reliability, validity, or both. For exam-
ple, these tests can yield distended categories of false positives and
false negatives. 91 One study of an MMPI-like test given to welfare
applicants to identify substance abusers misidentified 44% as addicts,
85. MISCHEL, supra note 43, at 34-37. The degree of correlation can vary considerably de-
pending on several variables, including the length of the test, the group of people measured, and
the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the subject sample, among others. Id. at 36-37.
86. "[T]he behaviors which are often construed as stable personality trait indicators actually
are highly specific and depend on the details of the evoking situations and the response mode
employed to measure them." Id. at 37.
87. Id. at 38.
88. Robert A. Nicholson & Steve Norwood, The Quality of Forensic Psychological Assess-
ments, Reports, and Testimony: Acknowledging the Gap Between Promise and Practice, 24 LAW
& Hum. BEHAV. 9, 40 (2000).
89. L. CAMILLE H8BERT, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW § 7:03 (2006).
90. Id.; see also JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE 132 (2000).
91. See PAUL, supra note 2, at 64.
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notwithstanding the serious consequences of being tagged with a posi-
tive result.92
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator has similar reliability problems.
The type-casting-the four-character sequence-may not be sturdy,
that is, it may have flimsy reliability. When one group of people took
the test twice across a short span of time, only 47% earned the same
type designation both times.93 Tellingly, the test's own publisher urges
that it should be used only to evaluate current employees, not to hire
new ones. 94
The projective tests have drawn similar criticism. Critics of the Ror-
schach Test contend that it has "essentially zero validity." 95 It may
also lead clinicians to overpathologize people.96 And as for the The-
matic Apperception Test, "[e]ven when used in a uniform manner, the
TAT has dubious validity and reliability, falling 'woefully short of pro-
fessional and scientific test standards.' "97 According to University of
Ottawa psychologist John Hunsley, it does not effectively diagnose
mental illness, in part because transitory moods and states may skew
the results. 98 This lack of consistency in test results over time suggests
a distressing lack of validity.
As discussed above, honesty or integrity tests are one subset of per-
sonality tests and have been widely popular with employers. But
though we may often yearn for a valid and reliable lie detector, so far,
none exists. The U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) has questioned the use of honesty testing to screen employees
and applicants. 99 Such tests have poor validity, producing significant
92. Id.
93. Id. at 133. The National Research Council commissioned an evaluation of performance-
enhancing techniques, including the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. The report, published in 1991,
noted that a variety of samples have found that 24% to 61% of test-takers receive the same
Myers-Briggs type when re-examined at intervals ranging from 5 weeks to 6 years. IN THE
MIND's EYE: ENHANCING HUMAN PERFORMANCE 96-97 (Daniel Druckman & Robert Bjork
eds., 1991) [hereinafter IN THE MIND'S EYE]; see also PAUL, supra note 2, at 133. As Annie
Murphy Paul notes, "That means, of course, that 39 to 76 percent are assigned a different type."
PAUL, supra note 2, at 133. The report's authors reason that the rate of changes "suggest caution
in classifying people in these ways and then making decisions that would influence their careers
or personal lives." IN THE MIND'S EYE, supra, at 97. Another study concluded that only 47% of
those tested fell within the same four-part type the second time they took the test as the first
time. PAUL, supra note 2, at 133. Paul remarks that "there is no evidence that [the test's] sixteen
distinct types have any more validity than the twelve signs of the zodiac." Id. at 134.
94. Julian Kesner, This Is Getting Personal, DAILY NEWS, Aug. 28, 2005, at 22.
95. PAUL, supra note 2, at 37.
96. Butcher, supra note 42, at 11.
97. PAUL, supra note 2, at 97. .
98. John Hunsley et al., Controversial and Questionable Assessment Techniques, in SCIENCE
AND PSEUDOSCIENCE IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 39, 53 (Scott 0. Lilienfeld et al. eds., 2003).
99. INTEGRITY TESTS, supra note 79, at 3, 32-33, 53.
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numbers of both false positives and false negatives: of those test-
takers classified as dishonest by the test, the proportion who were not
subsequently caught committing theft ranged from 73% to 97%, while
between 1% and 6% of test-takers "passing" the tests were later
found to have stolen from their employers-a significantly better rate,
but still worrisome when applied to a large number of test-takers.100
Overall, the misclassification rate of the tests studied ranged from
18% to 63%.101
The validity flaws may arise from the tendency of these tests to rely
on self-reporting by the target-that is, relying on both the honest and
the dishonest answering honestly. 102 The OTA's report also warned
against independent confirmation of the validity of honesty tests, not-
withstanding the assertions by test publishers that the tests are
valid. 03 The OTA noted that usually those interpreting the tests are
not trained in psychology and therefore they may treat the test results
inappropriately and at odds with the test's original purpose.104
The concerns of mental health experts with respect to the limits of
these tests have carried into the courts, which have expressed uneasi-
ness with the validity of these personality tests. For example, in In re
Vey the New Jersey Supreme Court evaluated the claim of a police
officer applicant who had been rejected based on the results of her
performance on the MMPI. 05 The court reversed the merit board's
rejection and remanded the case, noting that the record failed to show
that the personality traits her evaluation ascribed to her predicted job
performance.106
Courts and other reviewing authorities are alert to test invalidity
appearing in the form of false positives. For instance, Massachusetts's
100. Id. at 10-12.
101. Id. at 11.
102. Id. at 33-34, 48.
103. Id. at 8, 39, 49. The American Psychological Association Task Force on Dishonesty and
Theft in Employment Settings strongly discouraged the use of such tests as well, but warned
against the possible unintended consequences of banning them: "to do so would only invite
alternative forms of pre-employment screening that would be less open, scientific, and controlla-
ble." LEWIS R. GOLDBERG ET AL., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N, QUESTIONNAIRES USED IN THE
PREDICTION OF TRUSTWORTHINESS IN PRE-EMPLOYMENT SELECTION DECISIONS: AN A.P.A.
TASK FORCE REPORT 26 (1991).
104. INTEGRITY TESTS, supra note 79, at 40-42.
105. In re Vey, 591 A.2d 1333, 1333-34 (N.J. 1991).
106. Id. at 1336-38. On remand, the merit board decided yet again that the plaintiff should be
disqualified based on the results of the psychological test, and on appeal from that decision the
New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the disqualification. In re Vey, 639 A.2d 718, 718-19 (N.J.
1994) (per curiam). The dissenting justices in the latter case pointed out that "the record con-
tains no scientific reliability to the validation undertaken by the [employer]." Id. at 722
(O'Hern, J., dissenting).
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Civil Service Commission concluded that seven police job applicants
who were rejected by the Boston Police Department must be recon-
sidered.107 The Commission found fault with the department's psychi-
atric screening process, which rejected candidates for mental health
problems that "probably did not exist."'s Furthermore, even if the
tests were to accurately identify categories of personality types (that
is, to produce a minimum of false positives and false negatives), the
evidence does not sufficiently show that they accurately predict the
effectiveness of the target's performance on the job.109
The very act of testing, as opposed to the quality of the tests' results,
has also been challenged in court. Lawsuits against public employers
have alleged that a personality test invades a constitutionally pro-
tected interest in privacy; a significant portion of such suits involves
plaintiffs who sought to be either police officers or fire fighters.1'0
However, notwithstanding the flimsy evidence of validity, the trend
may be toward increasing such testing. After a mass slaying by a part-
time sheriff's deputy in Wisconsin in 2007, the Wisconsin legislature
considered a bill that would require pre-employment testing of all
such employees."'1 In Oregon, police chiefs sought to change state
law to allow them to administer polygraph tests to potential
employees.112
D. Employers' Misguided Justifications for Personality Assessments
More and more employers use personality tests in addition to back-
ground checks to help them determine whom to hire, even though the
tests may not be reliable. Furthermore, the tests may not be valid;
they may not accurately assess the traits they purport to measure, and
the traits measured may not in fact correlate well with those de-
107. Maria Cramer, Police, State Spar on Hiring, Bos. GLOBE, Dec. 4, 2009, at Al (quoting
one expert, M.L. Dantzker, as saying that "[tihere is no standardized acceptance of what proto-
cols to use" in administering the tests).
108. Id.
109. PAUL, supra note 2, at 134.
110. See, e.g., Thompson v. City of Arlington, 838 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (police
officer); Redmond v. City of Overland Park, 672 F. Supp. 473 (D. Kan. 1987) (probationary
police officer); McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355 (D.N.J. 1978) (fire fighter), affd, 601 F.2d
575 (3d Cir. 1979). This is not surprising given that the pool of possible plaintiffs includes only
those seeking governmental work and given the particular powers that police officers and
firefighters can exercise.
111. Kevin Giles, Shooting Spurs Officials to Seek Psych Tests for Deputies, STAR TRIB., Dec.
17, 2007, at B7.
112. Maxine Bernstein, Police Push to Polygraph Hires, SUNDAY OREGONIAN, Jan. 28, 2007,
at C1. The chiefs sought an exception to Oregon's law that prohibits the testing of employees or
applicants through polygraphs, in part to help improve how police respond to people with
mental illness-an increasingly frequent situation. Id.
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manded by a particular job. Though employers may seek to justify
these tests on the grounds of avoiding liability for employee behavior,
case law does not bear out this fear.
If personality tests are neither substantially reliable nor valid, why
do employers spend $400 million per year on them?113 Employers
have long sought to pigeonhole workers, getting the "best" talent for
the job.114 People are confusing and complex, but have a tremendous
impact on the functioning of a workplace. Who can blame employers
for wanting to get the most precise information that they can about
the human capital that serves them? However, the tests simply do not
deliver the sort of information that would allow employers to fulfill
their goals, undercutting the justification for intruding on employees'
privacy to try to inspect their personalities.
The tests may also be popular because they are inexpensive and can
be administered to large numbers of applicants. Furthermore, em-
ployers can outsource the testing to a third-party vendor, who can
take the burden of initially screening applicants for the employer.
Employers may have turned to personality testing after the federal
government outlawed the use of polygraph tests in most private sector
employment situations.115 However, many of the flaws in polygraph
testing that led Congress to outlaw polygraph testing of job applicants
may be present in personality tests.116 Employers understandably
want a quick and easy tool for looking inside an applicant's head, but
the device they seek simply does not yet exist. As Annie Murphy Paul
notes, "[M]any of the characteristics [the tests] claim to measure are
broad, fuzzy categories covering many kinds of behavior," rather than
discrete idiosyncrasies. 117
Employers may also be primed to believe the puffery of test ven-
dors, who warn of the potential consequences of failing to test. Test-
ing companies market these personality tests to busy and liability-shy
employers, as Paul notes, "often ... with a dose of alarmism."118 The
subset of personality tests known as integrity tests has drawn skepti-
cism from the American Psychological Association, which character-
ized some test publishers' promotional materials as "flagrantly
113. Jennifer Leonard Nevins, Comment, Measuring the Mind: A Comparison of Personality
Testing to Polygraph Testing in the Hiring Process, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 857, 858 (2005).
114. See ANASTASI & URBINA, supra note 50, at 3.
115. Nevins, supra note 113, at 859 (citing the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988,
Pub. L. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009); see also infra notes 219-22
and accompanying text.
116. See Nevins, supra note 113, at 859-60.
117. PAUL, supra note 2, at 66-67.
118. Id. at 66.
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hucksterish" and accused the publishers of making "wildly exagger-
ated" claims about the tests' abilities to reduce theft.119
Employers may argue that in addition to seeking to fit the right
person to the job, they must use personality testing to avoid liability
when a rogue employee commits a criminal act against another while
on the job or harasses a co-worker. However, an employer who fails
to use personality assessment or integrity testing will be unlikely to
incur liability for the omission;120 rather, liability tends to arise when
an employer fails to conduct a background check into an employee's
prior criminal history; that is, fails to find evidence of bad deeds rather
than bad thoughts. 121
Thus, the court in Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Sharara concluded that employers do not have any "blanket require-
ment" to scan their employees with periodic psychological tests simply
"to determine whether any employee has developed or is developing
negative or antisocial propensities," at least where the employee has
maintained a good work history.122 Accordingly, an employer re-
mains free from liability for failing to test or interview in lieu of test-
ing where an employee has a good work history.123 While the
majority in Sharara focused on the employer's burden rather than the
intrusion on the employee, in a special concurrence, one judge empha-
sized that an employer requiring "blanket" psychological testing with-
out the employees' consent would implicate "serious First
Amendment individual rights of privacy and other employee constitu-
tional and civil rights." 124
Even where an employer administers a personality test that yields
negative results, an employer will likely not be liable for the em-
ployee's subsequent bad acts when the employee's behavior did not
give the employer reason to believe the employee was a risk. For ex-
ample, in Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles, a police officer's psycho-
logical evaluation, which included an MMPI test and a test for alcohol
abuse, revealed that he might have abused alcohol. 125 However, the
119. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 103, at 20-21.
120. See S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Sharara, 307 S.E.2d 129, 131-32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
121. See HEBERT, supra note 89, § 1:02.
122. Sharara, 307 S.E.2d at 131-32 (reversing the lower court's denial of the employer's mo-
tion for summary judgment). The customer sued his employer under a theory of negligent hir-
ing, claiming that the employer should have subjected its employees to periodic personality tests
to discern violent tendencies. Id. at 131.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 132 (Deen, J., concurring).
125. Mendoza v. City of L.A., 66 Cal. App. 4th 1333, 1337-38 (1998). The plaintiffs were the
children of a woman who.had been shot by an off-duty police officer who was drunk at the time.
Id. at 1335. They argued that his employer, a municipality, was liable for their mother's death,
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officer's peaceful work history, along with an expert's criticism that
the test would "identify a large segment of false positives," 126 led the
court to conclude that the employer was not liable for employing the
officer.127 Similarly, a federal district court concluded that an em-
ployer could not be liable for negligence in hiring a salesman who
subsequently initiated a violent confrontation with a motorist, not-
withstanding that a pre-employment test had indicated that the em-
ployee was "a person of 'high aggression."' 128 The court reasoned
that the test results did not sufficiently notify the employer of any
purported violent tendencies of the employee, at least where he had
not displayed any such tendencies in the two years in which he had
been employed. 129
In sum, more and more employers use personality tests in addition
to background checks to help them determine whom to hire. How-
ever, personality tests are not terribly reliable: results can vary from
one testing episode to another and one evaluator to another. Further-
more, the tests may not accurately assess the traits they purport to
measure, and the traits measured may not in fact correlate well with
those demanded by a particular job. Liability fears do not justify per-
sonality tests either. Thus, the benefits do not justify the harms to
privacy these tests can impose, harms discussed in the next Part.
III. THE HARMS TO PRIVACY
Personality testing can harm individual privacy, first by intruding
unnecessarily on the individual's solitude, and second by revealing in-
timate information, possibly stigmatizing the individual. By putting
controls on employers' use of personality tests, the law can promote
supporting their claim with the psychological evaluation the employer had conducted prior to
hiring the officer. Id. at 1337-38.
126. Id. at 1338. The court concluded that any signs that the employee may have been abusing
alcohol did not suffice to establish proximate cause of the mother's death, given that the em-
ployee "had no history of past violence or excessive use of force." Id. at 1342.
127. Id.
128. Thatcher v. Brennan, 657 F. Supp. 6, 12 (S.D. Miss. 1986). In Thatcher, a federal district
court granted summary judgment to an employer on a negligent hiring claim brought by a person
assaulted by one of the employer's employees. Id. at 6-7. The employer had administered a
personality inventory test and an adaptability test before hiring the employee, and the evaluators
of the tests concluded that the employee was a "person of high aggression" and that the results
"appear[ed] to reflect a young person undergoing a great deal of emotional and personal stress
and turmoil." Id. at 11. The employer nonetheless hired the employee. The plaintiff argued
that the test results tended to show either that the employee had a propensity for violence or
that the employer knew about any such propensity for violence. However, the court rejected
this argument, pointing out that in the two-year span between the evaluation and the assault, the
employee had not had any incidents of violence. Id. at 11-12.
129. Id.
2012] 1149
DEPA UL LAW RE VIEW
personal autonomy, preserve personality, and discourage irrational
decision making.
Personality cannot be touched, bought, or sold. While behavior
provides us with a concrete example of conduct-a deed, an act-per-
sonality cannot be observed, measured, or tested directly. Instead,
one observes another's behavior and infers attributes of that person's
personality from those observations. That gap between the behavior
and our assessment leaves room for uncertainty. That gap allows us to
protect our personality as our own, a matter of privacy.
In launching the modern recognition of privacy rights in America,
Warren and Brandeis argued that each person has an "inviolate per-
sonality";130 to Professor Edward Bloustein, this inviolate personality
"defines man's essence as a unique and self-determining being." 131
The sociologist Erving Goffman also emphasized the concept of "per-
sonal identity," noting that "the core" of a person's being is "a general
and central aspect of him, making him different through and through,
not merely identifiably different, from those who are most like
him."132
Goffman described individuals as having internal "territories of the
self," defining a territory as a "field of things" or a "preserve" that an
individual is entitled "to possess, control, use, or dispose of."1 3 3 By
limiting, or even prohibiting, personality testing for employment uses,
we can allow individuals to preserve their internal territories of the
self and avoid the stigmatizing effects of the release of testing infor-
mation. A discussion of the specific threats to privacy that personality
tests pose and the benefits of controlling the use of such tests follow.
A. Threats to the "Territories of the Self": Intrusion, Disclosure,
and Stigma
Although each individual may have a stable collection of traits
unique to that person, people reveal different aspects of their person-
130. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 205
(1890).
131. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Pros-
ser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 971 (1964).
132. GOFFMAN, STIGMA, supra note 16, at 56.
133. GoFFMAN, The Territories of the Self, supra note 13, at 28-29. As Joel Feinberg has said,
"The root idea in the generic concept of privacy is that of a privileged territory or domain in
which an individual person has the exclusive authority of determining whether another may
enter, and if so, when and for how long, and under what conditions." 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw: OFFENSE TO OTHERS 24 (1985); see also Robert C. Post,
The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L.
REV. 957, 971-72 (1989).
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alities in different contexts. 134 When in public, individuals need to
create social facades to manage self and community.135 They also
need to be able to drop these facades in private; Goffman believed
that each person needs a "backstage" area, a place where the "masks"
that one wears for various appearances in social roles can be shed. 136
In the employment context, allowing employees to have a backstage
area can free them to better perform their jobs, benefitting the
employer.137
Though Goffman's work preceded modern information technology,
recent empirical evidence supports this theory of territories and
boundaries in digital arenas: we need to compartmentalize discrete ar-
eas of our lives, and we particularly need to be able to separate our
work lives from our social ones, a need that serves human dignity.' 3 8
Over half of the respondents in one study agreed with the statement,
"Work life is completely separate from personal life, and what you do
in one should not affect the other."139 Along those lines, two-thirds of
the respondents considered it "very inappropriate" for employers to
demand access to employee's social networking sites, 140 emphasizing
the boundaries that employees seek to maintain in the digital world.
If individuals are not permitted to maintain some boundaries, a
gated-off backstage area, their personal growth may suffer. The fol-
lowing discussion explores two particular harms that may arise from
employee personality testing that seeks to spotlight the "backstage"
area of an employee's personality: the injury of the intrusion into that
area and the sting from the revelation of stigmatizing or other sensi-
tive information acquired from the intrusion.
1. Intrusion
The act of testing can, in and of itself, damage one's dignity by in-
truding into the inner territories of a person's personhood, one's inner
life, reaching from the front stage to Goffman's backstage. The intru-
sion can break down the boundary between one's social persona (the
publicly visible employee) and one's private self.
134. See GOFFMAN, The Territories of the Self, supra note 13, at 31.
135. Cohen, supra note 5, at 1427 (citing GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF, supra note
15, at 128-30).
136. See GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF, supra note 15, at 110-12.
137. ROSEN, supra note 90, at 122-27 (2000) (citing GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF,
supra note 15, at 128-30).
138. Levin & Abril, supra note 15, at 1043-44.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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With the help of technology, employers have been able to widen the
gap in power between employer and employees by increasing the em-
ployers' abilities to observe employees, a transparency imbalance. 141
Some of this technology has allowed employers increasing access to an
employee's behavior. For example, surveillance cameras can record
employees' actions, Internet monitors can identify the websites that
employees visit, and keystroke loggers can identify the words that em-
ployees commit to a screen.
When an employer (in contrast to a therapist) demands personality
testing, the testing can be particularly intrusive, especially when
paired with the target's eagerness to find employment.142 That is, it
can emphasize the power imbalance between the employer and an
employee or hopeful applicant. Even as far back as the 1950s, person-
ality tests of job applicants and employees have been criticized for
their intrusiveness; William Whyte asked in The Organization Man,
"[I]s the individual's innermost self any business of the organization's?
... In return for the salary that The Organization gives the individual,
it can ask for superlative work from him, but it should not ask for his
psyche as well." 143
Personality testing differs from this sort of surveillance in that it
seeks to observe not just what an employee does, but how that em-
ployee thinks-processes that pertain not just to the employee's pres-
ence on the job, but the employee's being at all times: a surveillance of
Whyte's "innermost self." This sort of surveillance enhances the em-
ployer's power over the employee. As Professor Daniel Solove points
out, "The interrogator possesses extraordinary control over what in-
formation is elicited, how it is interpreted, and the impressions created
by its revelations."14 4 In her book Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Get-
ting By in America, author Barbara Ehrenreich noted the impact on
dignity of an employer's personality testing: "It is unsettling, at the
very least, to give a stranger access to things, like your self-doubts and
your urine, that are otherwise shared only in medical or therapeutic
situations."14 5
141. For instance, a 2007 survey by the American Management Association revealed that 66%
of the respondent employers monitored their employees Internet connections; 45% tracked con-
tent, keystrokes, and keyboard time; and 10% monitored social networking sites. The Latest on
Workplace Monitoring and Surveillance, AM. MGMT. Ass'N (Mar. 13, 2008), http://
www.amanet.org/training/articles/The-Latest-on-Workplace-Monitoring-and-Surveillance.aspx.
142. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 501 (2006).
143. WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN 201 (1956).
144. Solove, supra note 142, at 502.
145. BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (Nor) GETTING By IN AMERICA 209
(2001). Aside from questions of validity, though, the tests may invade privacy by asking the
target to disclose not just information about past job performance, but also information about
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Ironically, to expose deeply personal psychological information in a
job interview might well be considered inappropriate, violating, in the
words of the philosopher Thomas Nagel, the "conventions of re-
straint."146 We would not read our diary aloud to an employer, and as
Daniel Solove notes, we restrain ourselves from reading another's di-
ary.147 Nonetheless, an employer seeking psychological "truths" may
be just as intrusive and deserving of the same opprobrium.
This intrusion, and the resulting impact, is independent from the
test's reliability and validity; they occur whether or not a personality
test accurately measures the target's traits. The effect of having to
read and satisfy inquiries about one's innermost thoughts can itself
damage dignity. The examiner's probe itself breaches the boundaries
of the territories of the self.148 In the words of Edward Bloustein,
such probing violates the individual's "right to determine 'to what ex-
tent his thoughts, sentiments, emotions shall be communicated to
others.' "149 In contrast, protecting those boundaries from the insatia-
ble interest of employers-and others-protects us from being judged
out of context.15 0
The intrusion's harm exists unameliorated by a corresponding ex-
pectation of treatment or understanding, as would be true in a clinical
context. Rather, the employer, as personality examiner, seeks the in-
formation for its own use, to serve its own purposes, without any re-
sulting beneficial treatment.
2. Disclosure and Stigma
The target of a personality investigation may suffer more than just
harm from the intrusion; she may also suffer fear that the test results
will be disclosed. Disclosing any assessment of one's individual per-
sonality can itself be harmful; however, disclosing an undesirable trait
can stigmatize the target.15 The type of disclosure varies: the test ad-
ministrator will release results to an employer's agent; that agent can
beliefs and attitudes that may have nothing to do with the skills relevant to the job being filled.
Simply being asked the question may be unacceptably intrusive. Barbara Ehrenreich identified
such personality tests as among the "routine indignities" inflicted upon low-wage job applicants
in Nickel and Dimed. Id.
146. THOMAS NAGEL, Concealment and Exposure, in CONCEALMENT AND EXPOSURE 3, 8
(2002).
147. Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1045 (2003).
148. See GOFFMAN, The Territories of the Self, supra note 13, at 28.
149. Bloustein, supra note 131, at 971 (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 130, at 198).
150. ROSEN, supra note 90, at 20.
151. See INTEGRITY TESTING, supra note 79, at 12 (noting the stigma of being labeled as some-
one "at high risk to commit dishonest acts").
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disseminate the results to others in the organization; and the employer
can potentially report the results to others, either immediately or over
the course of time.
Regardless of how valid or reliable personality tests may be, em-
ployers use them because they believe them to reveal specific charac-
teristics of the target's personality. 152 In addition to developing
theories about "territories of the self," Erving Goffman studied
stigma, defined as "an attribute that is deeply discrediting"15 3 or even
a "mark of evil"154 in the eyes of observers. When others observe the
stigma, the individual can suffer shame and humiliation.155 "Each per-
son is aware of the gap between what he wants to be and what he
actually is, between what the world sees of him and what he knows to
be his much more complex reality."156 Goffman emphasized the so-
cial and moral impact of this sort of embarrassment, 57 "a special kind
of visibility and exposure." 1 s
While stigmas are often physical, psychological stigmas exist as well.
An example of a physical stigma might be a missing limb or a large
and unsightly birthmark. However, a personality trait may also be
stigmatizing if that trait is generally considered undesirable by others.
Thus, when a personality test purports to reveal undesirable traits in
the target-perhaps dishonesty or paranoia-those traits may bear
features of stigma, leading the target to feel discredited, ashamed, and
humiliated.159 These injuries would be over and above the disclo-
sure's more material consequences: the employer's employment deci-
sion based on the test's results.
152. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
153. GOFFMAN, STIGMA, supra note 16, at 2-3.
154. Paul Creelan, Vicissitudes of the Sacred: Erving Goffman and the Book of Job, 13
THEORY & Soc'y 663, 666 (1984).
155. See Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3
PSYCHOL. Pun. POL'Y & L. 645, 665 (1997).
156. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 33 (1970).
157. Michael Schudson, Embarrassment and Erving Goffman's Idea of Human Nature, 13
THEORY & Soc'y 633, 646 (1984) (agreeing with Goffman that "embarrassment is a profoundly
important feature of human motivation and social structure," but cautioning against viewing
human beings solely as "avoiders of embarrassment").
158. Massaro, supra note 155, at 666 (quoting FRANCIS J. BROUCEK, SHAME AND THE SELF 23
(1991)); see also Catherine L. Fisk, Humiliation at Work, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 73, 77
(2001) ("To be humiliated is to have one's 'significance,' that is, 'one's sense of having value in
the eyes of others,' undermined. . . . Humiliation typically occurs in relationships of unequal
power where the humiliator has power over the victim...." (quoting Linda M. Hartling & Tracy
Luchetta, Humiliation: Assessing the Impact of Derision, Degradation, and Debasement, 19 J.
PRIMARY PREVENTION 259, 261 (1999))).
159. This assumes, of course, that the target knows of the test's results.
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An individual may reveal such a trait through examples of behavior,
such as when someone who is prone to paranoia complains without
justification that government agents are stalking him. However, per-
sonality test results may reveal, or purport to reveal, a trait that has
not appeared in any actual conduct of the target. For instance, a psy-
chological test may suggest that someone is vindictive or prone to
stealing. If the test has sterling validity, which is unlikely,160 the target
may in fact have that trait, at least in particular contexts. Nonetheless,
the target may have effectively suppressed that trait overall or in the
specific context of the workplace, such that the individual has man-
aged his or her behavior despite the discrediting trait.161 In such a
case, the personality test serves as the sole window into the otherwise
invisible trait.
Some psychological traits may not be negative in the abstract, but
may nonetheless be inapt for the particular position. Thus, being
tagged with that trait may discredit the target in the particular context.
For instance, a particularly introverted person might make a poor
salesman, and a particularly exuberant person might make a poor un-
dertaker. In such an event, being tagged with the trait may still be
stigmatizing because it conflicts with the job's particular demands. It
may also pigeonhole the person, permanently labeling her with the
trait, a virtual tattoo of sorts.
Furthermore, stigmatizing may occur even when a personality test
cannot accurately pinpoint a person's particular personality traits.
That is, a test may attribute a trait that the target does not actually
have, yet the target may nonetheless suffer discrediting from the attri-
bution. For instance, a test may indicate that the target tends to para-
noia when in fact the target has quite realistic and stable relationships
with others. Regardless, the suggestion that a person has the unpleas-
ant trait of paranoia may be stigmatizing. The limits on a personality
test's ability to discern the target's inner traits may not be obvious to
the observer, who may well assume that the test is valid and that the
target actually harbors the stigmatizing characteristic.
The individual's injury from disclosure can first arise when the test's
administrator views the results; this person may be directly affiliated
with the employer or may be a third party. It can re-arise when the
test results become available to others beyond the first person to view
them, inflicting additional harm. Given the ease with which electronic
160. See supra notes 84-112 and accompanying text.
161. See INTEGRITY TESTS, supra note 79, at 64 (noting that someone identified as being at
high risk for dishonesty may be able to control her future behavior and "overcome" the exis-
tence of the trait).
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data can be copied, transferred, and publicized, the modern employee
or applicant can fear more than discrediting from only the initial ex-
aminer. The results of a test, regardless of accuracy and regardless of
relevance, may be viewed by any number of future potential employ-
ers, to say nothing of future potential acquaintances. Electronic
records may offer the illusion of transparency into the target's person-
ality, information that may be of salacious interest to many. Digital
data can also live in perpetuity, such that the target may always have
to wonder whether the report of what purports to be the inner work-
ings of his mind will be read by the next person met.
Should test providers and employers organize to do so, personality
test results could become amalgamated into a searchable database,
sort of a matchmaking site for employment, rather than matrimony-
a mall through which employers could shop for the right fit. On first
blush, this possibility may not seem something to fear, but given the
sensitivity of personality information and its individual nature, such a
database might make individuals feel truly exposed and dehumanized,
the backstage area put under a spotlight for ruthless perusal. 162 Algo-
rithms could assign people into personality categories much the way
marketing companies do for shopping: instead of "Chiphead" or
"Connoisseur,"163 individuals might be tagged as "Dull but Diligent"
or "Office Rabble-rouser." Individuals portrayed as having stigma-
tizing traits could end up blacklisted. In addition, given the shaky reli-
ability and validity of most personality tests,16 4 individual profiles
could well be inaccurate, but nonetheless impervious to the protests of
the profiled.
B. The Benefits of Controls on Testing
Privacy protections are tools conferred by law that can protect these
territories of the self; such protection can promote individual auton-
omy, allowing people to develop free from the interfering effects of
intrusion and disclosure.165 Furthermore, cloaking the intricacies of a
person's personality from the untrammeled gaze of others can protect
162. See GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF, supra note 15, at 112-13.
163. See McClurg, supra note 40, at 76 (describing the categories that the data aggregator
Acxiom uses to describe consumers).
164. See supra notes 84-112 and accompanying text.
165. GOFFMAN, The Territories of the Self, supra note 13, at 28-29. Robert Post describes the
boundaries as "defined by normative and social factors." Post, supra note 133, at 972. Jonathan
Kahn has observed that Post has "elaborate[d] a spatial conception of privacy as normative and
socially constructed. Such territories are contextual; their boundaries are socially determined
and vary according to a wide variety of factors." Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a Legal Principle of
Identity Maintenance, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 371, 393 (2003).
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those others as well because without access to the information they
will not be able to misunderstand or misuse the information. In the
employment environment, testing controls can benefit employers be-
cause they would be motivated to use better tools to find suitable
employees.
Protecting the boundaries of the territories of the self promotes in-
dividual autonomy. While Erving Goffman wrote primarily about
such territories in the context of individual face-to-face interactions,
privacy scholars have extended the concept to individual-to-
organization interactions, including employee-to-employer interac-
tions.166 Humans have a need to keep certain facts about themselves
entirely private.167 Potentially discrediting traits may well be among
those facts, but individuals need these boundaries to protect benign
information as well; individuals need for others to recognize that we
each have a circumscribed existence.168 A personality test adminis-
tered at an employer's behest can breach those boundaries and pre-
sent the individual as an inert thing to be examined, rather than an
autonomous person to be respected.169
Individuals need autonomy to fully develop and maintain their own
personalities.o7 0 Personhood requires the "freedom to define oneself"
without "being coerced into a definitive identity by an outside
force." 171 Just as individuals need the autonomy to create a backstage
that is cordoned off from view, they also need the autonomy to deter-
mine for themselves what persons they will be.
The need for autonomy to develop personhood does not fade over
time. Although we typically think of personality as being fixed, it is
not static. As put by John Dewey, a person is constantly evolving:
"something moving, changing, discrete, and above all initiating instead
of final."1 72 If we are fortunate, we flourish.
Testing may interfere with that development by animating the prin-
ciple known as the observer-expectancy effect by which a tester may
influence the target of a psychological test merely by observing that
166. Kim, supra note 14, at 691 n.101.
167. WESTIN, supra note 156, at 368.
168. See Kim, supra note 14, at 691.
169. F. ALLAN HANSON, TESTING TESTING: SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXAMINED LIFE
179 (1993).
170. Jeffrey Rosen, The Eroded Self, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 30, 2000, at 47, 66-67; see also
wESTIN, supra note 156, at 13 (describing anthropological studies as showing that in virtually all
societies, humans seek some privacy).
171. Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy, 71
B.U. L. REv. 133, 153 (1991).
172. JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE 215 (1929).
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target.173 The information that investigating, testing, and monitoring
can yield may well be sufficiently sensitive that individuals start to
mold their behavior to avoid negative reactions. If the test results in-
dicate a negative quality, a stigmatizing trait, that result may itself
cause the personality to change. Even if the target does not actually
possess that trait, to learn that the trait has been ascribed to him may
change the individual by altering his or her self-conception. 174
Controls on testing can also reduce irrational decision making. Pri-
vacy preserves one's external image in the eyes of others and can curb
others from making ill-informed choices based on limited, or even
false, information. The lure of personality tests is understandable.
Not only do they give the illusion of an MRI scan of the applicant's
personality, they offer a shortcut for making complicated decisions
that may involved many variables and people. Psychological tests may
lull employers into believing that they have learned the "truth" about
an applicant, the "real person" behind the mask. The test's results
may provide the employer with an "aura of logic." 7 5 However, the
intrusion may well not be justified by the benefits to the employer.176
Employers, or more specifically, the individuals making employ-
ment decisions for employers, are not immune to the cognitive biases
that affect many of us and may make quick judgments out of con-
text.177 Daniel Solove warns that private information is particularly
vulnerable to being misunderstood because "people have a limited at-
tention span for learning the complete story."'17  In the context of
personality tests, the person receiving a snapshot of the assessment of
another's inner mind may well seize upon isolated or discrete facets of
the assessment, highlighting a particular detail divorced from a larger
and more complete picture of the person.179 Below are two specific
types of distorting effects, one known as the "devil's-horn effect," and
the other the "availability bias." These biases may interfere with the
employer's best interests, causing the employer to lose what would
have been a valuable, productive employee.
173. INTERPERSONAL EXPECTATIONS: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND APPLICATIONS 130 (Peter
David Blanck ed., 1993).
174. GOFFMAN, STIGMA, supra note 16, at 32. Goffman notes that one who suddenly acquires
a defect "may relatively quickly experience a change in apparent personality." Id. at 132.
175. Victor Gold, Covert Advocacy: Reflections on the Use of Psychological Persuasion Tech-
niques in the Courtroom, 65 N.C. L. REv. 481, 490 (1986-1987).
176. See supra notes 84-112 and accompanying text.
177. J.D. Trout, Paternalism and Cognitive Bias, 24 LAW & PHIL. 393, 408 (2005) (arguing that
governments may legitimately regulate to correct cognitive biases in some circumstances).
178. Solove, supra note 147, at 1036.
179. See ROSEN, supra note 90, at 10 ("[T]here is a growing danger that a part of our identity
will be confused with the whole of our identity.").
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The devil's-horn effect, one such cognitive bias, may lead an em-
ployer to emphasize one undesirable trait over other, more desirable
traits.180 The employer may view the employee as a person with a
trait, rather than a person with one trait among many. An employer
who reads of an applicant's answer to a question about whether, for
example, the applicant believes in God 81 may allow that answer to
obscure information about other traits of the individual that the em-
ployer may find more favorable. One plaintiff noted that this particu-
lar question troubled him as he was taking the MMPI for a position as
a firefighter: he worried that he would not be hired if he answered
no. 182
The availability bias, another well-recognized bias, identifies an-
other misuse of information, which occurs when one designates an
easily remembered event as being representative. 183 That is, a highly
colorful or recent event may anchor in one's memory and instill the
belief that the event is more common than it actually is.184 We may
overemphasize the importance of available information, especially
when it is presented vividly or is recent.'85 This tendency can cause us
to misassess risk. For example, people are inclined to underestimate
the risks of relatively unpublicized causes of death such as heart dis-
ease or stroke and likewise overestimate highly publicized ones such
as accidents, homicides, or electrocutions.186 Employers may suffer
from the bias if they recall instances of employers being held liable for
an employee's bad behavior when, as discussed above, the risk of lia-
bility for failing to conduct or act on a personality test's results is fairly
low.'8 7 Or an employer may recall a single unfortunate hire over nu-
merous successful ones. The marketing materials of personality test
purveyors may play upon such visibilities. 8 8 Ideally, employers would
assess the risk of employing someone with particular traits based on
180. See id. at 137-38 (referring to the effect of a past misdeed on the observer's evaluation of
the target's character); see also Miguel Angel Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evi-
dence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 1003, 1047 (1984) (describing how jurors can overestimate the tendency of an accused to
act in accordance with prior behavior).
181. That question from the MMPI led to an applicant's lawsuit in McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F.
Supp. 1355, 1365 (D.N.J. 1978), aff'd, 601 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1979).
182. Id.
183. Trout, supra note 177, at 399.
184. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 457-58 (2003).
185. See Trout, supra note 177, at 399.
186. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
REv. 683, 707 (1999).
187. See supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
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empirical data tying improved or diminished employee performance
to specific personality traits that were accurately identified, but so far
such data is generally not available.
By cloaking personality information, disclosure protections can
safeguard against these sorts of irrational judgments.189 Now, not all
judgments that employers may make based on personality tests will
necessarily be irrational; as Professor Julie Cohen has pointed out,
"[t]he need to judge others out of context is the logical product of
rational self-interest" in some contexts.190 But the shaky reliability
and validity of such tests, discussed above, undercuts the rationality of
making judgments based on them. Protecting employees' and appli-
cants' privacy by restricting the use of such tests can not only foster
their autonomy and allow them to develop their personalities, but may
well help employers make decisions that will enhance rather than di-
minish productivity.
Finally, privacy safeguards may also benefit society at large. Privacy
does not just protect individuals; by protecting individual privacy, we
help society function in a predictable and personality-preserving
way.191 Privacy can serve "common, public, and collective purposes"
in addition to individual purposes.192
In summary, personality tests can harmfully intrude on individuals
coerced into taking them, and the results may stigmatize individuals
by characterizing them, whether accurately or not, as having certain
undesirable traits. Protecting individuals from such testing and disclo-
sure can promote individual autonomy, which will allow the individu-
als to develop their personalities free from the unwarranted
interference that such testing may cause. Furthermore, such protec-
tions need not be to an employer's detriment, but may in fact neutral-
ize two cognitive biases that personality tests may foster: the devil's-
horn effect and the availability bias. Employers would remain free to
use testing tools that have the reliability and validity that personality
tests do not have, allowing them to fulfill their needs without the
harmful effects on privacy and personality.
189. See Solove, supra note 147, at 1034.
190. Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Jeffrey Rosen, 89 GEO.
L.J. 2029, 2033-34 (2001).
191. ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 429 (enlarged ed. 1968)
("'Privacy' is not merely a personal predilection; it is an important functional requirement for
the effective operation of social structure.").
192. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 150 (2004)
(quoting PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 221 (1995)).
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IV. THE INADEQUATE PATCHWORK OF EXISTING DISPARATE
LEGAL STRUCTURES
Personality testing in and of itself has drawn little topical legislation
at either the state or the federal level. However, both federal and
state law offer legal structures that bear on the investigation and sur-
veillance of employees-structures that can apply to personality test-
ing. The U.S. Constitution sometimes protects employees or potential
employees of public employers. Among federal statutes that may ap-
ply are the Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA),193 the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act (ADA),194 and the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA).195 A state may also have constitutional provisions that
protect privacy, and some states have enacted statutes designed to
preserve some areas of privacy from employers. States also have com-
mon law privacy torts that may apply to personality testing. However,
overall these privacy tools are uneven, patchy, and inadequate to fully
protect individuals from intrusive personality testing.
A. Federal Protections
Federal law provides some constitutional protections for govern-
mental employees. Federal statutes specify their beneficiaries, and
those addressing polygraphs, disability discrimination, and credit re-
porting may protect employees from personality tests in some circum-
stances, or at least offer possible models for a new solution.
1. Federal Constitutional Protections
Federal privacy protections can arise under the U.S. Constitution's
First Amendment and also under the Fourteenth Amendment and its
193. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (2006). The EPPA grants six categories of exemptions, one of
which specifically declares that the Act does not apply to governmental employees. Id.
§ 2006(a). Other exemptions allow polygraph testing of experts and consultants who work in
some capacity with U.S. governmental entities related to national security, id. § 2006(b), employ-
ers who provide security services or are in businesses involving federally controlled substances,
id. § 2006(e)-(f), and significantly, polygraphs administered in the course of an ongoing investi-
gation of an economic loss or injury to the employer's business, id. § 2006(d). However, to
benefit from the ongoing-investigation exemption, the employer must reasonably suspect that
the examined employee was involved in the incident and must provide the employee with a
written statement that provides specified details of the incident. Id. Where an exemption ap-
plies, the employer may not reveal the test's results beyond certain designated disclosures, which
include the test-taker, the employer that requested the test, and courts and similar entities in
accordance with a court order. Id. § 2008.
194. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, amended by Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (Sept. 25,
2008).
195. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x.
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concept of personal liberty.196 The First Amendment may constrain a
government from testing that inquires into a person's beliefs.197 In
Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, the petitioner successfully challenged
the denial of her application to the Arizona state bar on the grounds
that she refused to disclose whether she had been a member of the
Communist party or any other organization "that advocates over-
throw of the United States Government by force or violence."1 98 The
Supreme Court reasoned that "[w]hen a State seeks to inquire about
an individual's beliefs and associations a heavy burden lies upon it to
show that the inquiry is necessary to protect a legitimate state inter-
est." 199 The Court implicitly recognized the link between one's beliefs
and one's interior being, a being the individual is entitled to shield
from unjustifiable probing.
Aside from the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects two kinds of privacy interests: the interest in "avoiding disclosure
of personal matters" and the interest in "independence in making cer-
tain kinds of important decisions." 200 The disclosure protection may
restrict public (though not private) employers in their use of personal-
ity tests, given the potential for stigma. The decisions indicate that
courts give great weight to the employer's asserted interests. How-
ever, although those interests may outweigh the employee's resistance
to the test's intrusion, some courts nonetheless respect the concern
that the employer will disclose the results and caution employers to
keep the results of such tests confidential.
For example, in Walls v. City of Petersburg, the Fourth Circuit ex-
amined the employment test required of the plaintiff, a police depart-
ment employee fired after refusing to fill out the test.201 Arguing that
the test invaded a constitutionally protected zone of privacy, the em-
ployee specifically objected to being questioned about her possible
homosexuality, marital history, financial information, and the criminal
records of family members.202 The court concluded that while the
plaintiff could not claim a privacy interest in information available
from public records, such as her marriage and divorce background,
she could claim a privacy interest in information about her personal
196. Other constitutional provisions, such as the Fourth Amendment, can pertain to privacy
but are not discussed here.
197. See Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 1 (1971).
198. Id. at 4-5.
199. Id. at 6-7.
200. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 & n.23 (1977).
201. 895 F.2d 188, 190 (4th Cir. 1990).
202. See id. at 193-94.
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finances.203 Nonetheless, the court identified the employer's concerns
with corruption among city employees as sufficiently compelling to
outweigh those privacy interests. 204 In short, the intrusion into the
employee's privacy was justified.
The Walls court specifically considered the danger of unauthorized
disclosure of those test results that revealed nonpublic information,
effectively recognizing that an employee has a constitutionally pro-
tected interest in the confidentiality of such information. 205 Neverthe-
less, the court concluded that this particular employer satisfactorily
protected the information. 206 The employer kept the results in a pri-
vate filing cabinet that was available to only four persons and was
locked at night.207 Significantly, the court suggested that a public em-
ployer that does not protect sensitive test results may face liability:
"[I]f this type of information had been more widely distributed, our
conclusions might have been different." 208 Furthermore, the court
warned of advancing technology and cautioned that "we need to be
ever diligent to guard against misuse." 209
While Walls involved a more traditional employment test that in-
quired about behavior rather than personality, the privacy of psycho-
logical tests came under scrutiny in McKenna v. Fargo.210 The
McKenna court held that the psychological tests the defendant re-
quired of the plaintiffs, who sought employment as firefighters, in-
truded upon their constitutional right to privacy. 211 The required
evaluation was comprised a number of traditional personality tests,
including the MMPI, the Rorschach Test, and the Thematic Apper-
ception Test.212 No single test screened the candidates; rather, a
trained clinical psychologist evaluated the results in conjunction with a
personal interview with the candidates. 213 The court viewed the em-
ployer's reliance on psychological testing with overt skepticism: "Psy-
chology is not yet the science that medicine is and tests are too
203. Id.
204. Id. at 194.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Walls, 895 F.2d at 194.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 194-95.
210. See 451 F. Supp. 1355 (D.N.J. 1978), affd, 601 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1979).
211. Id. at 1381.
212. Id. at 1359-60. In addition, the employer used the Edwards Personal Preference Sched-
ule (a self-report inventory like the MMPI), the Incomplete Sentence Test, and the Draw-a-
Person (or Human-Figure Drawing) Test. Id. at 1360-61.
213. Id. at 1362-63.
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frequently used like talismanic formulas." 214 The court also recog-
nized the particular harm such tests can cause:
The evaluation looks deeply into an applicant's personality, much as
a clinical psychologist would if requested to do so by an applicant.
Fire-fighter candidates are called upon to reveal the essence of their
experience of life, the collective stream of thoughts and feelings that
arise from the ongoing dialogue which individuals carry on between
the world and themselves in the privacy of their being. It involves a
loss of the power individuals treasure to reveal or conceal their per-
sonality or their emotions as they see fit, from intimacy to
solitude.215
Nonetheless the McKenna court, like the Walls court, concluded
that the state's interest in "identifying applicants whose emotional
make-up makes them high risk candidates for the job of fire fighting"
justified the intrusion that the psychological evaluation posed.216 In
rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the tests did not accurately eval-
uate the applicants' personalities, the court described the tests as hav-
ing a margin of error that did not rise to the level of unreliability.217
Again, just like the Walls court, the McKenna court was sensitive to
the plaintiffs' fear that the defendants would disclose the test results;
the court emphasized that the defendant should prevent the disclosure
of the information gathered by the testing program and retain the data
for only a limited period of time, destroying it thereafter.218
Thus, courts appear to recognize that the U.S. Constitution's pri-
vacy protections apply to the interests of employees in avoiding intru-
sive testing, but they are ready to allow a public employer's interest in
the test results to outweigh the employee's concerns. Nonetheless,
while allowing the testing itself, courts validate employees' concerns
that someone else's eyes will fall upon the results.
2. Federal Statutory Protections
The U.S. Constitution, of course, pertains only to the staffing of
governmental jobs and not to those in the private sector. Certain fed-
eral statutes, however, cover a much broader pool of employers. Con-
gress's most decisive move against any sort of psychological test was
to enact the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, which pro-
hibits private employers engaged in interstate commerce from using
214. Id. at 1357.
215. Id. at 1380-81.
216. McKenna, 451 F. Supp. at 1381.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1382.
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polygraphs to screen job applicants. 219 The EPPA allows polygraph
testing only for employment that entails certain security functions or
access to controlled substances, or for qualified investigations into em-
ployment misconduct. 220 Personality tests resemble polygraph tests in
that they, too, seek to delve beneath the surface of answers to ques-
tions to find out what the test-taker is "really" thinking (or has "re-
ally" done). However, Congress explicitly rejected an opportunity to
pull "pencil and paper tests" into the EPPA's protections;221 instead, it
applies only where the test uses a mechanical or electrical device to
measure the target's physiological responses to questions.222
A subsequent statute, the federal ADA, has led to vibrant debates
about personality testing, employment, and discrimination. The ADA
permits employers to test their employees and applicants but with sev-
eral restrictions. The ADA marks a point in the timeline of the em-
ployment relationship: employers have more freedom to test
applicants after the employer makes an offer.223 As a general rule, the
ADA allows employers to conduct medical examinations after the em-
ployer has offered employment, so long as the "examination or in-
quiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity."224 However, before the employer extends an offer, it may
not inquire of an applicant's possible disabilities, but may only ask
whether the applicant can perform specific, essential, job-related
functions. 225
In applying the ADA to personality testing, courts have sought to
distinguish personality traits, which do not receive protection from the
ADA, from mental disorders, which do.226 Commentary about the
ADA by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
indicates that the agency envisions a reasonably sharp distinction be-
219. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (2006).
220. Id. § 2006(e)-(f).
221. H.R. REP. No. 100-659, at 11 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 749, 750 ("The con-
ferees also do not intend to include written or oral tests (commonly referred to as 'honesty' or
'paper and pencil' tests) within the definition of lie detector."). Wisconsin has likewise ruled that
a paper honesty test did not fall within the prohibitions of the state's polygraph test act. Plus-
kota v. Roadrunner Freight Sys., Inc., 524 N.W.2d 904, 908 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (reasoning that
the honesty test did not measure physiological responses of the test subject).
222. 29 U.S.C. § 2001(3) (defining "lie detector").
223. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d).
224. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4); see also Befort, supra note 18, at 386-87.
225. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.13(a), 1630.14(a) (2010).
226. Smith, supra note 54, at 105-06 (describing the difference as "socially constructed,"
rather than something that can be measured, and describing the courts' treatment as an ap-
proach of "I know it when I see it"); see also 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (stating that individuals
with "common personality traits such as poor judgment or a quick temper" are not considered
disabled "where these are not symptoms of a mental or psychological disorder").
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tween personality testing and medical testing. In its Enforcement
Guidance on Pre-Employment Disability-Related Inquiries and Medi-
cal Examinations, 227 the EEOC provides that employers may conduct
psychological testing at the pre-offer stage so long as the tests do not
rise to the level of a medical examination.228 Thus, a test that is de-
signed and used to measure only traits such as "honesty, preferences,
and habits" is not a medical examination. 229 A psychological exami-
nation crosses into medical examination territory when it would pro-
vide evidence that would lead to identifying a mental disorder or
impairment. 230
However, these two categories-"psychological testing" and "medi-
cal examinations"-may deceptively appear to be discrete. One
scholar has suggested that the difference between "personality traits"
and "mental illness" is socially constructed, rather than based in em-
pirical data.231 Common personality traits, such as anxiety, can also
be characteristics of a mental disability, and thus evidence of that trait
may also evince a mental disorder.232 Regardless of what mental
health professionals may think, courts interpreting the ADA have fol-
lowed the lead of the EEOC in distinguishing "mental illness" from
"personality traits." 233
227. U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, Enforcement Guidance: Preemployment
Disability-Related Questions and Medical Examinations (Oct. 10, 1995), available at http://
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/preemp.html [hereinafter ADA Enforcement Guidance I]. The
agency has also issued guidelines for post-hiring testing. U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity
Comm'n, Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of
Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (July 27, 2000), available at http://
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html [hereinafter ADA Enforcement Guidance
II]. For additional information, see Smith, supra note 54, at 130-32.
228. ADA Enforcement Guidance II, supra note 227.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Smith, supra note 54, at 105 ("[M]ental disability is not something separate and apart
from personality, it simply represents extremes along a variety of cognitive and affective con-
tinua." (quoting SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOW PROMISES: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 63 (2002))).
232. See STEFAN, supra note 231, at 63 (noting that among characteristics of mental disability
in the workplace that can be considered "common personality traits" are "the inability to toler-
ate stress, difficulties with interpersonal and social relationships, and periodic difficulties in fo-
cusing and concentration"); U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Enforcement
Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities (Mar. 3, 1997),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html [hereinafter ADA Enforcement Gui-
dance III].
233. See, e.g., Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 214-15 (2d Cir. 1989) (concluding that a police
applicant who was assessed as having "poor judgment, irresponsible behavior and poor impulse
control" was nonetheless not regarded as disabled, affirming the dismissal of the applicant's
Rehabilitation Act claim); Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 935 (4th Cir. 1986) (concluding that an
employee with acrophobia, or fear of heights, was not disabled for purposes of the Rehabilita-
tion Act because it did not substantially limit his ability to work); Mickens v. Polk Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
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Only one federal appellate circuit, the Seventh Circuit, has wrestled
with the overlap between a personality test and a medical test for pur-
poses of the ADA. In Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., the plaintiffs,
employees of the defendant, challenged the defendant's use of the
MMPI in promoting employees.2 34 At issue was whether the MMPI
was prohibited as a "medical examination" under the ADA. 2 3 5 The
defendant used a personality test that included a version of the MMPI
test that comprised 502 questions, some of which required the appli-
cant to declare as either true or false certain statements that appeared
to move beyond personality into inquiries of mental distress. Among
the suspect statements were "At times I have fits of laughing and cry-
ing that I cannot control" and "My soul sometimes leaves my
body. "236
The employer argued that the test was meant to identify personality
traits, not to reveal mental illness.23 7 However, the Seventh Circuit
rejected that argument, concluding that the MMPI is a medical exami-
nation for purposes of the ADA. 2 38 The test's origins significantly in-
fluenced the court, which noted that the test was "designed, at least in
part, to reveal mental illness." 2 3 9 The court emphasized that the
MMPI not only measures personality traits but also "considers where
an applicant falls on scales measuring traits such as depression, hypo-
chondriasis, hysteria, paranoia, and mania. In fact, elevated scores on
certain scales of the MMPI can be used in diagnoses of certain psychi-
atric disorders." 240
If a personality test is a medical examination under the ADA, an
employer may not use it to screen applicants before employing
430 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1274 (M.D. Fla. 2006) ("Emotional volatility or imbalance is not a disabil-
ity .... ); Pouncy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 920 F. Supp. 1566, 1580-81 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (con-
cluding that the employer's request that an employee with a "bad attitude" seek personal
counseling did not indicate that the employee was perceived as disabled); Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar
Exam'rs, 861 F. Supp. 512, 517 (E.D. Va. 1994) (mem.) (stating in dicta that a bar applicant's
depression was not a disability because it did not substantially limit her ability to perform any
major life activity, suggesting that depression is merely a "commonplace condition"); see also 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (2010) (interpreting "physical or mental impairment" and specifying that
individuals with "common personality traits such as poor judgment or a quick temper" are not
considered disabled).
234. 411 F.3d 831, 833-34 (7th Cir. 2005).
235. Id. at 835.
236. Id. at 833 & n.1. Questions on the Revised MMPI include "I like mechanics magazines"
and "I have never indulged in any unusual sex practices." L. CAMILLE HeBERT, EMPLOYEE
PRIVACY LAw § 7:1 (2006 & Cumulative Supp. 2007).
237. Karraker, 411 F.3d at 835.
238. Id. at 837.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 833-34 (footnote omitted).
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them.241 Furthermore, after offering the applicant a job, the employer
may only test the target if the employer shows that the personality test
is "job-related and consistent with business necessity." 242
In addition to the ADA, the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act may
offer some protection in the guise of a source that may initially appear
to be inapt. The report of an applicant's or employee's personality
test may well fall within the FCRA, even if the test avoids matters of
credit. The FCRA subjects consumer reporting agencies to a variety
of accuracy and privacy restrictions, and commercial testing entities
likely fall within that category.243 The FCRA defines "consumer re-
porting agency" quite broadly, in part because it defines "consumer
report," an essential term of the definition, quite broadly. A con-
sumer report "means any written, oral, or other communication of any
information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's
credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living" where that in-
formation is "used or expected to be used or collected" for, among
other purposes, "the consumer's eligibility for" employment.244 In
turn, a "consumer reporting agency" includes "any person which, for
monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly en-
gages . . . in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit
information or other information on consumers for the purpose of fur-
nishing consumer reports to third parties." 245 The broad definition of
a consumer report includes information that bears on "personal char-
acteristics," a term sufficiently broad to include psychological testing
and medical examinations.246 Thus, an institution that administers
psychological tests to employees or applicants on behalf of employers
will likely be a consumer reporting agency because it regularly assem-
bles or evaluates information on consumers (test-takers) for the pur-
pose of communicating information about a consumer's personal
characteristics (his personality) for employment purposes.247
However, just because a test administrator might be a consumer re-
porting agency does not necessarily mean the test-taker will receive
the FCRA's protections for consumer reports. The sources of infor-
mation in the report determine its status; if the report contains abso-
lutely nothing but "information solely as to transactions . .. between"
241. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13(a) (2010).
242. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2006).
243. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e, 1681h.
244. Id. § 1681a(d)(1) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
245. Id. § 1681a(f). The definition includes an interstate commerce nexus as well. Id.
246. Id. § 1681a(d)(1).
247. See id.
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the employee and the test administrator, the report will likely be ex-
empt from the definition of a consumer report, leaving the employee
unprotected by the FCRA's disclosure restrictions. 248 In contrast, if
the test inquires into the test-taker's experiences with others, or if the
test report includes data from sources other than the test-taker, the
test report should qualify as a consumer report and the FCRA's pro-
tections will ensue. 24 9
In contrast to a third-party test administrator, an employer that con-
ducts such tests itself would likely not be a consumer reporting agency
unless it was itself in the business of furnishing consumer reports to
third parties.250 In that case, the FCRA would not prohibit the em-
ployer from disclosing the information revealed by the test and thus
would not provide test-takers with any protection.
The FCRA has both virtues and vices for purposes of keeping pri-
vate personality test information. For instance, the FCRA appears to
allow the target to consent to the gathering and disclosure of the test-
ing information by demanding that an employee or applicant grant
her consent to the employer's obtaining the report. 251 However, noth-
ing in the FCRA prevents an employer from conditioning an offer or
continued employment on the target's consent, which indicates a false
choice. Especially in times of high unemployment, an individual may
well feel compelled to sacrifice privacy for a paycheck, regardless of
whether the information sought is relevant to the work performed for
that paycheck.
The FCRA also requires consumer reporting agencies to block
some information it may learn about an applicant from the report pro-
vided to an employer. 252 For instance, recognizing that old informa-
tion may be less relevant to an individual's eligibility for credit or
employment, the FCRA designates most adverse information as obso-
lete after seven years.253 With respect to criminal arrests, the FCRA
248. Id. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(i). Furthermore, given that the definition of a consumer reporting
agency depends upon the definition of a consumer report, an entity that issues only reports that
contain nothing but "information solely as to transactions . . . between" employees and the test
administrator, the entity will fall outside the FCRA's definition of a consumer reporting agency.
See id. § 1681a(d)(1), (d)(2)(A)(i).
249. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(i).
250. See id. § 1681a(f).
251. Id. § 1681b(b)(1)-(2). Employers that are investigating employee misconduct need not
notify the target of the investigation ahead of time, so long as the investigation meets the criteria
of the exception and the employer later provides the notice that the exception requires. Id.
§ 1681a(x).
252. Id. § 1681c(a).
253. Id. § 1681c(a)(2). Bankruptcy records, in contrast, may be included in someone's credit
report for up to ten years. Id. § 1681c(a)(1).
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prohibits the agency not only from disclosing the obsolete arrest re-
cord, but also the mere existence of an arrest record. 2 5 4
However, whether personality test results would be considered "ad-
verse" has not yet been litigated, so the obsolescence rule's effects are
uncertain. Furthermore, the obsolescence rule is gouged by its excep-
tion that permits reports to include old information for employees
who are expected to make $75,000 or more per year. 2 5 5 In this situa-
tion, the report from an employment or consumer-reporting agency
could list everything that the agency could find out about the individ-
ual, including information-such as personality test results-from
many decades ago.
The FCRA also requires an employer that intends to take an ad-
verse action against an applicant or employee on the basis of a person-
ality test's results to notify that individual prior to taking the adverse
action. 256 Though the clear purpose of this notice provision is "to en-
able an employee applicant to receive his draft report and correct any
... inaccurate information in the report before any decision or action
is commenced," 257 nothing requires an employer to delay a decision
while the consumer tries to straighten out an inaccurate report. How-
ever, an employee or candidate may not readily be able to dispute the
results of a personality test. Doing so might require the employee to
submit the results to a qualified expert, a time-consuming task.
254. E.g., Serrano v. Sterling Testing Sys., Inc., 557 F. Supp. 2d 688, 691-92 (E.D. Pa. 2008)
(concluding that such information is prohibited by either 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2), which pertains
to arrest records, or 15 U.S.C § 1681c(a)(5), which pertains generally to any other adverse items
of information). Nonetheless, criminal convictions-regardless of whether felony or misde-
meanor-never become obsolete and may be reported in perpetuity. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(5).
255. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(b)(3). Congress last raised this cap in 1996, when $75,000 would have
been equivalent to more than $105,000 in today's dollars. Omnibus Consolidated Appropria-
tions Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2406, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). Accordingly, the breadth of
the exception has extended to cover a great many jobs, including sales jobs based on commission
where the employee could expect to accrue commissions or tips sufficient to boost the salary to
more than $75,000.
256. The FCRA provides as follows:
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), in using a consumer report for employment
purposes, before taking any adverse action based in whole or in part on the report, the
person intending to take such adverse action shall provide to the consumer to whom
the report relates-
(i) a copy of the report; and
(ii) a description in writing of the rights of the consumer under this subchapter, as
prescribed by the Federal Trade Commission under section 1681g(c)(3) of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
257. Beverly v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:07CV469, 2008 WL 149032, at *3 (E.D. Va. Jan.
11, 2008) (mem.); see also Johnson v. ADP Screening & Selection Servs., Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d
979, 983-84 (D. Minn. 2011) (noting that, while "there must be some time between notice and
action," a delay of fourteen days was "ample" and that "[n]othing in the FCRA requires an
employer to consider any correction that a reporting agency might make").
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In sum, personality testing is regulated by the Constitution and may
be regulated by various federal statutes, but none of these protections
clearly and consistently protect individuals from the intrusion of test-
ing or the stigma that could arise from the disclosure of test results.
B. State Protections
1. State Constitutional Protections
While the Federal Constitution can restrain only public employers
from disseminating psychological test results, a state constitution may
apply to private employers in addition to public employers. For in-
stance, in Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., the plaintiff challenged a
private employer's personality test as violating the right to privacy
granted by California's constitution.258 The trial court concluded that
the employer's use of a pre-employment test called "PsychScreen," a
combination of the MMPI and another psychological inventory, vio-
lated the California constitution's privacy clause 259 by examining the
applicant's religious beliefs and sexual orientation; 260 the employer
settled the case. A psychologist offered evidence for the plaintiff that
the test violated basic professional standards and that one test on
which PyschScreen was based was designed for use only in hospital or
clinical settings.261 Furthermore, two of the employer's experts had
previously opined that the MMPI was "virtually useless as a preem-
ployment screening device" and suggested that PsychScreen had a
258. Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 79 (Ct. App. 1991), review granted,
822 P.2d 1327 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed, 862 P.2d 148 (Cal. 1993). The plaintiffs also brought
two state statutory claims that were rendered unnecessary by the court's ruling on the constitu-
tional privacy claim. Id. at 86.
259. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All people are by nature free and independent and have inalien-
able rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."). While Cali-
fornia may have most clearly extended its constitutional privacy provision to cover private as
well as governmental actors, other state constitutions explicitly protect privacy as well, See
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAw. CONs-r. art.
I, § 6; ILL. CONsT. art. I, §§ 6, 12; LA. CoNsT. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONsT. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST.
art. 1, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
260. Soroka, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86. The settlement mooted the appeal. Among the questions
were the following: "I wish I were not bothered by thoughts about sex"; "A minister can cure
disease by praying and putting his hand on your head"; and "I have often wished I were a girl."
Id. at 80. The court concluded that a compelling-interest standard, rather than a reasonableness
standard, was appropriate. Id. at 83-85. The court reasoned that the California constitutional
provision required a nexus between the information gathered and the purpose for which the
information is gathered. Id. at 85. "While [the employer] unquestionably has an interest in
employing emotionally stable persons . . . , testing applicants about their religious beliefs and
sexual orientation does not further this interest." Id.
261. Id. at 80.
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sixty-one percent rate' of false positives. 262 Thus, the test suffered
from precisely the sort of validity problems discussed above.263
The appellate court's opinion was superseded when the litigants set-
tled,2 6 4 but the substance of that opinion illustrates how the court ap-
plied the state constitution to personality testing. Any invasion of job
applicants' right to privacy, the court declared, must be justified by a
compelling, not merely a reasonable, interest.2 65 The court then con-
cluded that the employer had failed to show that the objectionable
questions on the personality test, pertaining to religion and sexual ori-
entation, were related to the jobs the applicants sought.266 The court
decisively rejected as sufficient the employer's "generalized claims"
that the test related to emotional fitness and that it had led to an
"overall improvement" in the quality of the employees' perform-
ance. 267 In so doing, the court was demanding that the personality test
have validity and that it correspond to measurable improvement in
the goal sought; a "minimal and speculative" relationship cannot jus-
tify such testing.268
Thus, California's constitution can protect against the intrusion
posed by a required personality test, one of the two privacy harms that
personality tests can inflict. In addition, the provision may protect
against the disclosure of a psychological evaluation's results, the other
privacy harm. In Pettus v. Cole, an employee sued two psychiatrists
and his employer after learning that the psychiatrists had provided the
employer with information from his sessions that did not pertain di-
rectly to his employment.269 A California appellate court reversed the
trial court's judgment for the employer, ruling that the employee had
stated a claim that the disclosures invaded his constitutional right to
262. Id.
263. See supra notes 84-112 and accompanying text.
264. Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 822 P.2d 1327 (Cal. 1992).
265. Soroka, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84-85.
266. Id. at 86.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 86, 88-89.
269. Pettus v. Cole, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46 (Ct. App. 1996). In Pettus, the employer required the
employee to receive a psychological evaluation after the employee requested a short-term disa-
bility leave for a stress-related condition. Three psychiatrists evaluated the employee and con-
firmed the employee's need for leave. Two of the psychiatrists, however, disclosed in the
evaluations additional information that the employee had revealed, including information about
substance abuse that did not relate directly to the request for leave. The court determined that
the employee had a legitimate and reasonable privacy interest in the information and rejected
the psychiatrists' protests that the disclosure was justified by the employer's needs, concluding
that the scope of the disclosure exceeded those needs.
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privacy and concluding that the specific disclosures went beyond the
scope of the employer's interest in the information.270
Nonetheless, state constitutions will not sufficiently protect the right
of employees to be free from psychological testing; few other states
have the sort of constitutional privacy protections that California
does, nor has case law developed to alert employers and employees as
to the boundaries of permissible testing.
2. State Statutory Protections
While California may regulate personality testing of employees
through its constitution, other states have sought to protect employee
privacy through statutory provisions. For instance, some states have
legislated to bar employers from administering polygraph and other
lie detector tests, 271 augmenting the federal Employee Polygraph Pro-
tection Act.272 Some of these statutes bar not only polygraphs, but
also any "similar test or examination," and arguably a personality test
assessing one's honesty could be read to fall within such a category.273
However, two such statutes have been construed to exclude honesty
tests from the prohibition.274 Many states also have their own credit
reporting statutes that may, like the federal FCRA, be broad enough
to pertain generally to background checking and specifically to per-
sonality testing. Unfortunately, the FCRA not only does not ade-
quately protect against employee reports, including those reporting
test results, but states likely cannot fill in the gap as the federal act
preempts state laws with respect to the content of consumer re-
ports. 275 Given that this preemption provision predates modern infor-
mation technology and lightning-quick access to public records
through the Internet, states have never had a true opportunity to reg-
ulate the dispersal and gathering of data about employees.
270. Id. at 77.
271. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (1974 &
repl. vol. 2005).
272. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
273. See HEBERT, supra note 236, § 7:17.
274. State v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735, 745 (Minn. 1981) (construing Minne-
sota's polygraph statute as language extending to "any test purporting to test honesty to be
limited to those tests and procedures which similarly purport to measure physiological changes
in the subject tested" and rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the state's polygraph statute was
unconstitutionally vague (internal quotation marks omitted)); Pluskota v. Roadrunner Freight
Sys., Inc., 524 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (confining the reach of a Wisconsin statute
to prohibit only tests measuring physiological responses, and not reaching pencil-and-paper
tests).
275. 15 U.S.C § 1681t(b)(1). Only those statutes in place on September 30, 1996 survive the
FCRA's preemption provision. Id. § 1681t(b)(1)(E).
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State statutes may also bar employers from considering some em-
ployee conduct that occurs off-site and after work in making employ-
ment decisions. By far the most common of these statutes prohibit
employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of to-
bacco use. 27 6 However, some state statutes extend broadly to protect
an employee's use of lawful products in general, 277 and a few addi-
tional states advance protections beyond simple product consumption
to off-duty conduct by employees generally. 278 New York may have
the broadest provision-one that extends to an employee's off-hours
political activity, legal use of consumable products, and legal recrea-
tional activities. 279 However, because such anti-discrimination stat-
utes focus on behavior rather than on personality, they probably do
not extend to cover an employee's possession of a particular personal-
ity trait. .
3. Common Law Torts
Privacy statutes, whether state or federal, tend to address a specific
topic-credit reports, polygraphs, or medical information, for in-
stance-rather than provide blanket protection, and thus, they are not
always able to anticipate and cover new forms of technology or pri-
vacy invasions. State common law, however, has more plasticity and
thus offers a rich potential for curbing the profligate use and disclo-
sure of sensitive personal information, including personality test re-
276. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-105(a)(iv) (2011) (prohibiting employers from conditioning em-
ployment on the use of tobacco products); see also Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do
when You Are Not at Work?: Limiting the Use of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse
Employment Decisions, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 640-41 (2004).
277. E.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/5(a) (2011); MoNr. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313(2) (2011);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304(e) (repl. vol. 2008); see also Sprague, supra note 24, at 411-16.
278. CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2011) (granting the labor commissioner authority over
claims "for loss of wages as the result of demotion, suspension, or discharge from employment
for lawful conduct occurring during nonworking hours away from the employer's premises");
COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5 (West 2008) (exempting activity that "[rlelates to a bona
fide occupational requirement or is reasonably and rationally related to the employment activi-
ties and responsibilities of a particular employee"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (2011)
(limited to employees who exercise state or federal First Amendment rights); N.Y. LAB. LAW
§ 201-d(2) to -d(3) (McKinney 2009) (excluding any activity that "creates a material conflict of
interest related to the employer's trade secrets, proprietary information or other proprietary or
business interest"); see also Sprague, supra note 24, at 395. For further critical analysis of these
lifestyle anti-discrimination statutes, see Jason Bosch, Note, None of Your Business (Interest):
The Argument for Protecting All Employee Behavior with No Business Impact, 76 S. CAL. L.
REV. 639 (2003) (arguing that employers use their economic influence to unjustifiably control
the autonomy of their employees).
279. See N.Y. LAB. LAw § 201-d(2). One New York court concluded that the firing by Wal-
Mart of an employee for dating a co-worker could violate the provision. State v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., No. 80737/93, 1993 WL 649275, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 1993).
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sults. The privacy torts can apply both to the intrusion posed by
personality tests as well as the disclosure of test results.
The intrusion tort has three elements: (1) an intentional intrusion;
(2) on a place of solitude; and (3) that is highly offensive to a reasona-
ble person.280 The harm arising from the intrusion of a psychological
test has been recognized as supporting a common law privacy claim.
In Keno v. Station KYW-AM Infinity Broadcasting Corp., the plaintiff
alleged that she had advised her employer of a diagnosis of bipolar
disorder and that thereafter her employer discriminated against her,
required her to undergo a psychiatric evaluation by a psychiatrist cho-
sen by the employer in order to maintain her employment, required
her to allow others access to her personal medical information, and
then falsely indicated to other employees that she had sought a leave
of absence. 281 The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss her
intrusion upon seclusion, false light, and public disclosure claims.282
In upholding the intrusion claim, the court specifically noted the plain-
tiff's allegations that the employer interrogated her about her illness
and medications, and forced her to undergo a psychiatric
evaluation. 283
Nonetheless, intrusion claims by employees have not fared particu-
larly well.28 4 The tort requires that the intrusion must be highly offen-
sive to a reasonable person, an elevated bar to attain.285 Thus, it may
not protect employees from overly intrusive examinations, surveil-
lance, or testing by employers that, while not shockingly offensive,
nonetheless unreasonably crosses into a territory that should remain
internal to the employee and subject to the employee's control. The
ubiquity of personality and psychological testing may itself undermine
a plaintiff's claim that the testing was highly offensive. For instance,
in Witherspoon v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., an employee sued after his em-
ployer required him to submit to a personality test as a condition for
promotion.286 The employee alleged that the test asked for religious,
280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
281. Keno v. Station KYW-AM Infinity Broad. Corp., No. 04-2147, 2004 WL 2367824, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2004) (denying the employer's motion to dismiss).
282. Id. at *3-5.
283. Id. at *4.
284. See Pagnattaro, supra note 276, at 631-37 (describing employee intrusion claims as gen-
erally falling into one of the following four categories: "1) sexual-related information; 2) general
non-work-related personal information, such as medical and financial information; 3) issues re-
lated to the use of technology; and 4) investigations in connection with workers' compensation
and disability claims").
285. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
286. 173 F. Supp. 2d 239, 241 (D.N.J. 2001).
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medical, and sexual information.287 The employee's intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress claim failed; the court reasoned that the fact
that "standardized psychological testing of this type for management-
level positions has been around for several decades, and thus cannot
be 'utterly intolerable in a civilized society,"' an element of an emo-
tional distress claim. 288
As discussed above, the probing of one's personality impermissibly
intrudes; separate and apart from that injury is the injury that arises
when the tester or the employer discloses the information. An em-
ployer that discloses personal information about an employee's
mental health may also be liable for the tort of public disclosure of
private facts. This tort has four elements: (1) the defendant gives pub-
licity to a matter; (2) that matter concerns the private life of another;
(3) the matter publicized would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person; and (4) the matter is not of legitimate concern to the public. 289
The first element significantly limits its use to redress a tester's or
employer's disclosure of a personality test's results: to incur liability,
the employer must have publicized the matter to a certain number of
people. Emailing the information to all of the employees of the em-
ployer may suffice. 290 However, disclosure to just a few of the em-
ployer's personnel may not. In Childs v. Williams, the plaintiff had
been referred by her employer to a psychologist after she had suffered
work-related stress arising from a conflict with her supervisor. 291 The
psychologist provided the employee's supervisor with details of the
employee's psychological tests, telling the employer that the employee
suffered from "severe emotional disorders," "paranoid personality,"
and "obsessive compulsive personality"; 292 the supervisor then shared
the psychologist's letter with seven other members of management. 293
The employee's public disclosure claim failed because the psycholo-
287. Id. The employee also alleged that the defendant used the results of the test as a pretext
to deny him a promotion on racial grounds. Id.; see also Gardiner v. Mercyhurst College, 942 F.
Supp. 1055, 1059-60 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (rejecting the plaintiff's defamation claim, which arose
from a psychologist's disclosure of information about his psychological testing on the grounds of
qualified privilege); Lundy v. City of Calumet City, 567 N.E.2d 1101, 1102-03 (1ll. App. Ct. 1991)
(rejecting an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim by police officers who were re-
lieved of duty based on indeterminate psychological test results, reasoning that while the em-
ployer may have been insensitive in delivering the results, the conduct did not rise to a tortious
level).
288. Witherspoon, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 242.
289. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
290. See Keno v. Station KYW-AM Infinity Broad. Corp., No. 04-2174, 2004 WL 2367824, at
*4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2004).
291. Childs v. Williams, 825 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
292. Id.
293. Id.
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gist's disclosure reached only a limited number of eyes, those of the
employer's management personnel. 294
As with the intrusion tort, the "highly offensive" element may also
block claims based on unreasonable disclosures that somehow fall
short of that high water mark.
V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
An ideal legal framework would have features of justification, test
reliability and validity, confidentiality, and accountability. First, to
justify testing, the rules should minimize any intrusion by allowing em-
ployers to examine only those aspects of an employee's or candidate's
past behavior or current personality that pertain directly to the spe-
cific skills required by the job the employer seeks to fill. The exami-
nation's scope and the subsequent use of the information obtained by
the examination could be curtailed by requiring employers to articu-
late a business necessity for the information that is proportional to the
scope of the intrusion and the sensitivity of that information.
Second, when an employer has a legitimate interest in intruding on
such territories, the employer should be able to use only those tests
that have demonstrated reliability and validity. Thus, an employer
should have to establish that a particular personality test that the em-
ployer uses is reliable-that is, the test consistently measures the spe-
cific personality traits that it purports to measure. The employer
should further have to establish that the test is valid-that it accu-
rately measures the traits it purports to measure. The employer
should have empirical evidence that the test results correlate with en-
hanced performance in the particular employment position for which
the target is a candidate.
Third, the framework should ensure that employers keep confiden-
tial both the fact that an individual took an exam and the exam's re-
sults. Finally, those who suffer harm to their privacy from a violation
should be able to hold the employer accountable for the invasion
through money damages and equitable remedies.
294. Id. at 9. In addition, the court concluded that the plaintiff had waived her privacy rights
by signing a release, rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the psychologist exceeded the scope
of that release by providing the employer with highly sensitive and private medical information.
Id. at 9-10. A similar claim, based on the U.S. Constitution, failed in Thompson v. City of
Arlington, 838 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Tex. 1993). There, the court concluded that while the plain-
tiff-employee did have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in her mental health records,
on balance the city's interest in having those records exceeded her interests in light of the power
granted to police officers. Id. at 1146-47.
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Many of the legal structures discussed above, including the EPPA
and the ADA, have one or more features that could serve one or
more of these purposes; none of them would on its own easily adapt to
satisfactorily protect privacy.
A. Justification
Given that personality tests are not particularly reliable or valid and
that the courts have recognized this in refusing to impose liability for
an employer's failure to administer them, an employer's untested,
unexamined claim that it needs information about an employee or ap-
plicant for legitimate business purposes should not, without more, jus-
tify personality testing. A search through an applicant's past deeds, as
employers typically conduct through traditional background checks,
differs from a search of an applicant's current state of mind. If an
employer asserts a need to learn of an employee's or applicant's per-
sonality, that employer should have to detail a specific need and how
the information sought will satisfy that need. Only then should the
court balance the strength of the relationship between the information
sought and the need against the potential damage to the employee's
privacy of acquiring that information. As Professor Pauline Kim
wrote, "[T]he more closely an employer's inquiries or practices trench
on interests at the recognized core of individual privacy, the greater
the need for some specific justification." 2 9 5 This inquiry should ex-
amine the particular nature of the employer's business and the posi-
tion.296 If, for instance, the position required only general skills that
could be satisfied by employees with a range of personalities, the need
for the information would be weak and would lose out to even a rela-
tively weak level of intrusion. On the other hand, if the position could
only be fulfilled adequately by someone with a specific personality,
the employer's interest rises correspondingly and could justify more
intrusion on the applicants.
An outright prohibition against the use of personality tests would
arguably unfairly hobble employers with a legitimate business need to
employ someone with a particular personality, or to avoid someone
with a particular personality. A somewhat less draconian approach
would be to set a general rule prohibiting personality tests, but al-
lowing them in certain limited circumstances where the test could help
an employer fill a legitimate need. The EPPA has this structure, and
295. Kim, supra note 14, at 706.
296. Id. at 707. So, for instance, Professor Kim notes that "a health club which employs fit-
ness trainers has a legitimate interest in the health status and physical conditioning of its employ-
ees to an extent that the employer of clerical workers does not." Id.
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polygraph tests and personality tests raise common concerns. Con-
gress enacted the EPPA amid concerns that polygraphs were widely
used but often inaccurate. 297 Furthermore, they can intrude signifi-
cantly on privacy, much like personality tests.
The EPPA provides a general rule that bans the tests joined with a
list of exceptions,298 exceptions limited quite narrowly to polygraphs
for certain national security related needs,299 ongoing investiga-
tions,300 and a couple of other specific situations.30' These provisions
capture the same sort of justification concern, with a narrow span, as
that discussed above. The model law proposed in this Article would
offer an exception where an employer has demonstrated a need for a
particular type of personality or trait, and that need outweighs the
individual's interest in maintaining the privacy of information related
to that trait.
In addition, just as the EPPA sets requirements for a polygraph re-
port, a model law could require a personality test examiner to exclude
from the report any information or conclusions regarding any aspect
of the individual that fall outside the specific need of the employer.
This would tailor the results to fit just those needs claimed by the em-
ployer. However, a model law's ban on personality tests should ex-
tend to governmental employers as well as private ones; the EPPA
applies only to the latter.
The ADA also has features that could be adapted to a model law.
The ADA requires employers to justify medical tests before imposing
them, a feature that could be adapted to personality tests and incorpo-
rated into a model personality protection law. As it stands, the ADA
may already apply to personality tests;302 however, a model personal-
ity test privacy law would explicitly require an employer to justify its
need for not just any test, but the specific test that the employer seeks
to use.
Short of enacting a separate law, the ADA could be amended to
satisfy the justification feature by expanding the Act's definition of
medical examinations. With respect to medical examinations, the
297. See 134 CONG. REC. 14,007 (1988) (statement of Senator Kennedy, speaking in support
of the law, stating that polygraphs were "little more than a 20th century version of witchcraft").
298. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2002, 2006 (2006).
299. Id. § 2005(a)-(c).
300. Id. § 2006(d). In addition, the EPPA's exemption for ongoing investigations, intended to
allow employers to administer polygraph tests to uncover illicit losses, has its own set of require-
ments. Id. § 2007.
301. Id. § 2006(e) (providing an exemption for security personnel); id. § 2006(f) (providing an
exemption for certain investigations into controlled substance use).
302. See infra notes 303-06 and accompanying text.
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ADA prohibits covered entities from conducting a medical examina-
tion or inquiring as to whether a job applicant has a disability pre-
employment.30 3 The ADA does permit the entity to make pre-
employment inquiries-though not examinations-into "the ability of
an applicant to perform job-related functions." 304 Once the employer
has offered a job to the applicant, the ADA permits the employer to
require a medical examination, subject to specific limitations. 305 For
current employees, the employer must show that the examination or
inquiry to be job related and consistent with the employer's business
necessity.306 These limitations help ensure that an employer probes
into individuals' health status only when the needs of a particular job
specifically justify it. Extended to personality tests, the ADA could
similarly permit a personality test only where an employer can iden-
tify specific characteristics of a job that demand specific personality
traits in order to be executed well.
B. Reliability and Validity
A comprehensive personality testing privacy law would also place
limits on the persons who could administer tests and on the sorts of
tests that could be administered, requiring that a test be both reliable
and valid before required of an employee or applicant. The EPPA
provides an example of testing requirements, when it is permitted.
For instance, the EPPA's exception for ongoing investigations, in-
tended to allow employers to administer polygraph tests to uncover
illicit losses, has its own set of requirements.o 7 These requirements
both demand certain qualifications of the examiner, 308 including a li-
cense and professional liability insurance, 309 and limit the examiner's
report to the specific purpose for which the report was sought.310 Just
as a polygraph examiner must meet specific requirements, a model
personality test privacy law should require certain certifications for a
personality test examiner. For instance, a test examiner might be re-
quired to have a degree in industrial-organizational psychology and
303. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A).
304. Id. § 12112(d)(2)(B).
305. Id. § 12112(d)(3).
306. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(A). However, the ADA permits employers to conduct voluntary medi-
cal examinations that are part of an employee health program. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(B).
307. 29 U.S.C. § 2007.
308. Id. § 2007(c)(1).
309. Id.
310. Id. § 2007(c)(2)(A)(ii). Specifically, the report must not "contain information other than
admissions, information, case facts, and interpretation of the charts relevant to the purpose and
stated objectives of the test." Id.
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administer a test that was limited to the specific need the employer
has identified to justify the test.
Not only should the personality test examiner have to have creden-
tials and expertise, but the test itself should have to be reliable and
valid, supported by empirical data showing a strong link between test
results and the particular qualifications of the job the employer sought
to fill. The field of employment discrimination law has already devel-
oped the requirements of test validation; these could be adapted to
personality tests.311 For example, the EEOC provides specific guide-
lines to judge the validity of employment tests that may unfairly dis-
criminate on the basis of a protected characteristic. 312 These
guidelines permit an employer to justify a test with studies conducted
by test publishers or distributers, though users remain responsible for
ensuring that the information necessary to support validity exists and
is available.313 Adapted to personality tests, an employer could either
validate the test itself or rely, with care, on validity studies conducted
by a personality test's publisher. These credential, validity, and relia-
bility requirements would protect privacy by keeping employers from
haphazardly fishing for traits unconnected to the employer's needs
and by promoting accurate results.
C. Confidentiality
A confidentiality requirement that prohibited employers from
broadcasting test results would curb the harm of disclosure and the
risks of stigmatizing individuals.314 A model law could specifically
prohibit employers from disclosing personality test results to any third
311. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (2011) (prohibiting selection procedures that have an adverse im-
pact on "members of any race, sex, or ethnic group" unless the procedure has been appropriately
validated); id. § 1607.5 (providing general standards for validity studies).
312. See id. pt. 1607.
313. Id. § 1607.7.
314. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act offers a model that could be incorporated into legislation
directed at personality tests, providing as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, a nonaffiliated third party that re-
ceives from a financial institution nonpublic personal information under this section
shall not, directly or through an affiliate of such receiving third party, disclose such
information to any other person that is a nonaffiliated third party of both the financial
institution and such receiving third party, unless such disclosure would be lawful if
made directly to such other person by the financial institution.
15 U.S.C. § 6802(c). Thus, it restricts financial institutions from disclosing nonpublic personal
information of customers when the customer has opted out of such disclosures. Furthermore,
even when a financial institution makes a disclosure that is exempt from the nondisclosure provi-
sion, the receiver of the information must not redisclose the protected information to a third
party unless the Act would permit the financial institution to have disclosed the information
directly to a third party.
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parties, ideally even corporate affiliates. Such a provision would dis-
courage the creation of databases of personality inventories.
Here, too, the ADA offers a possible example. The ADA limits
employers from publicizing the results of medical tests by requiring
employers to treat them as confidential medical records.315 A parallel
provision, adapted to personality tests, would permit employers to test
for the personality traits that they need from an applicant or employee
without allowing them to sell or otherwise disclose the information to
others. Such a designation would also bolster a state tort claim for
breach of confidentiality by expressly tagging the information as
confidential.
The FCRA may already apply to some personality tests but insuffi-
ciently protects confidentiality. As written, the FCRA already im-
poses restrictions on those who administer personality tests for the
purpose of furnishing reports to employers; that is, third-party test-
ers.3 16 Furthermore, the FCRA's provisions that impose special confi-
dentiality requirements for medical information should apply to
information gleaned from personality tests.317 If personality test re-
sults qualify as medical information, entities cannot share the informa-
tion with affiliates,318 so the designation in effect would restrict the
employer from disseminating the information even to related entities.
In addition, the FCRA limits the redisclosure of medical informa-
tion;319 extended to personality tests, employers would have to keep
results confidential and could not provide them to third parties such as
other employers.
Nonetheless, a model personality test privacy law would explicitly
prohibit the release of test results, which would prevent the stigma-
tizing pigeonholing of individuals who are thought to have one or an-
other trait. A stricter provision could require employers and test
administrators to destroy the test results.
315. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B).
316. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f); see also supra notes 243-57 and accompanying text.
317. The FCRA's definition of medical information includes information that relates to "the
past, present, or future physical, mental, or behavioral health or condition of an individual." 15
U.S.C. § 1681a(i)(1)(A). Information from a personality test should be considered information
about the "mental[ ] or behavioral health or condition of an individual." Id.
318. Complicatedly enough, the FCRA excludes from the definition of "consumer report"
certain communications of information among affiliates. Id. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(ii), (iii). How-
ever, the provision then excludes medical information from the affiliate exclusions. Id.
§ 1681a(d)(3).
319. Id. § 1681b(g)(4).
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D. Accountability
Most of the federal statutes that bear on privacy offer accountabil-
ity; that is, public and private enforcement provisions. Ideally, a com-
prehensive personality test law would offer not only a private cause of
action for those injured by a violation, but would also allow equitable
relief, including injunctions. The EPPA has an exemplary provision
that has all of these qualities. 320 The FCRA, in contrast, undermines
accountability by withholding relief from individuals for many of its
most critical protections. 321 When coupled with weak governmental
enforcement, this feature effectively signals to the regulated that they
can violate the law with impunity.322
E. State Reforms?
Many of these statutory reforms could take place at the state level,
if not the federal, by state adaptation of a law with the four features
discussed above. One concern, however, arises from the FCRA's pre-
emption provisions that prevent states from regulating the content of
a permissible consumer report-a term that, as discussed above,
should encompass a report of a personality test issued by a third-party
tester.3 23
Any of these tools could preserve dignity of individuals by helping
them preserve the life of the mind from unjustified intrusion and con-
trol the disclosure and misuse of information about their inner selves.
These could in turn help individuals to flourish with the knowledge of
a protected "backstage." Furthermore, restricting employers from us-
ing personality tests need not hinder employers from finding the best
candidates. Employers should not fear liability from omitting person-
ality tests for their applicants. If a personality test exhibits both relia-
bility and validity, it may be an appropriate selection tool. In that case
an employer should have to justify the test's use by showing that the
employer's needs outweigh any invasion of privacy suffered by the
test-taker and that it will minimize unnecessary disclosure of the test's
results. In addition, employers may use other selection tools to staff
their positions; for instance, job performance tests that require an ap-
plicant to complete simulated tasks that mimic those required of the
320. 29 U.S.C. § 2005(c)(1).
321. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 1681s-2(c).
322. See Elizabeth D. De Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 6-14
(2008) (describing the FCRA's lack of effective remedies).
323. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(E) (preempting state laws that regulate the "subject matter"
of 15 U.S.C. § 1681c, which defines the permissible content of consumer reports).
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particular position may be much more likely to sift out unpromising
candidates than a personality test.
VI. CONCLUSION
Erving Goffman developed his theories of "territories of the self"
and stigma in the context of face-to-face interactions, but they have
the power to illustrate the harms to privacy in the digital, Internet age.
Much of our behavior is available to employers through background
checks, interviews, social network searches, and data mining. How-
ever, information about our past acts differs qualitatively from infor-
mation gained through personality tests, and such information
deserves to be protected from employers' prying eyes. Such tests pur-
port to reveal detailed information about the inner workings of one's
way of thinking; however, not only are such tests unreliable, they
often do not accurately assess what they claim to assess. Even when
they do, the information they reveal may not be relevant to an em-
ployer's needs.
Individuals need to preserve their territories of the self for their
own benefit; allowing employers to pick the brains of potential or cur-
rent employees gives them too much power to intrude on the individu-
als' privacy and can also lead to pigeonholing, or even stigmatizing,
individuals, thus cramping their development. Except where employ-
ers can demonstrate that a reliable, valid test is necessary to obtain an
effective employee for a particular position, they should not be able to
demand that applicants or employees subject themselves to personal-
ity tests. Current legal structures are insufficient to protect individuals
from such prying; the federal statute that prohibits polygraph tests,
with restricted exceptions, can serve as a model for a statute prohibit-
ing personality testing. Rather than suffering, employers could bene-
fit from improved screening practices that do not rely on unreliable or
invalid tests, while individuals could preserve the privacy and integrity
of some of their most sensitive personal information.
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